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Controlled experiments have found that mixed-sex interaction 
triggers the use of gender status beliefs encouraging actors to view men as 
more status worthy than women (Correll & Ridgeway 2003; Foschi 
2000). When these mechanisms are at play in actual employment settings, 
the implication is that employers will be more inclined to hire, promote, 
and praise male workers even when they produce identical evidence of 
competence that their female counterparts.  
Although hiring settings are rarely accessible to researchers, this 
project identified a unique exception that permitted direct observation and 
data collection on real evaluations made in the course of live interactions. 
The context of this study is the Spanish exam system that is used to 
recruit applicants to fill important and highly desirable government jobs 
where women are currently under-represented.  
The first part of this project analyzes how male and female 
applicants fare at each testing round. I examined quantitative pass/fail 
exam data gathered from the Internet and information obtained from 
direct observation of exam sessions. Consistent with gender status 
theories, I found that female applicants scored higher than male applicants 
when exams evaluated female-typed skills and lower than male applicants 
when exams involved assessing neutral abilities – this effect was 
 substantial in less structured exams (i.e. exam 3) where judges and 
applicants engage in an actual dialogue.  
The second section of this work analyzes the features and content 
of the live conversations that take place in the Q&A portion of exam 3. I 
audio-taped and transcribed 83 judge-applicant conversations and found 
that exam judges behave differently toward male and female applicants 
even when applicants perform at the same level. In particular, judges 
interrupt women more, ask them more questions, and are less persuaded 
by the objective quality of their answers.  
The main contributions of this work are (i) a substantive one, of 
increasing our knowledge on the sources of gender segregation, (ii) 
applying theory developed in laboratory settings in a natural context, and 
(iii) a methodological one, of using the method of conversation analysis to 
understand the dynamics of judges-applicants interactions.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Gender inequality in employment persists despite important 
structural changes such as  the movement of women into paid labor and 
the increase in the number of women pursuing higher education. Despite 
these steps forward, women are still disadvantaged in the job market. 
Wage differences in particular exist largely because men and women 
occupy different jobs (Reskin 1993). Although the causes of occupational 
sex segregation are multifaceted, discrimination by employers surely 
contributes to it (Blau & Kahn 2006). 
When individuals deduce others’ ability from their performances, it 
is often the case that not all actors are assessed according to the same 
criteria. Despite providing the same evidence of skill, actors are evaluated 
differently because ability inferences are based on performers’ personal 
attributes such as race or gender (Foschi 1989). Frequently, individuals 
are judged based on generalized beliefs about the social category to which 
they belong, rather than on the objective quality of what they say/do. This 
process has important implications in a wide variety of settings, 
particularly those where implicit and explicit evaluations are the focus of 
the interaction – e.g. job interviews, promotions, salary decisions etc. 
 This work draws from status characteristics theory (SCT) and 
double standards theory (DST), both of which are concerned with how 
status attributes such as gender influence behavior and the evaluation of 
task performance in mixed-sex social interaction. SCT and DST are not 
theories of discrimination per se but, insofar as they explain how and why 
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employers come to prefer men when making hiring, promotion and salary 
decisions, these theories are relevant for understanding the persistence of 
gender inequalities in the labor market.  
Even though sociologists and social psychologists have amply 
demonstrated that gender systematically organizes the perception of 
competence and influence in favor of men (see Correll & Ridgeway 2003; 
Foschi 2000), researchers have argued that the dynamics of gender 
discrimination in the workplace will not be fully understood until detailed 
data are collected on less scripted settings (Biernat & Fuegen 2001; 
Ridgeway & Correll 2004).  
Real-world hiring contexts are seldom accessible to researchers, 
thus observation and/or systematic data collection are rare. In fact, 
Fernández and Sosa (2005) have noted how almost all research on gender 
segregation begins with data on people who already have jobs, and very 
little empirical evidence exists on the workings of hiring1. While 
Fernández and Sosa (2005) have data on real evaluations of employees, 
their research does not examine the processes by which evaluations 
unfold. My work takes advantage of an original context where I was able 
to observe and collect data on the actual interactions taking place as 
potential employees were interviewed by exam evaluators.  
 
Context & Setting 
The context of this study is the exam system used in Spain to 
recruit applicants for important and highly desirable government jobs. In 
Spain civil service competitions are public and typically involve the face-
                                                
1 Fernández & Sosa (2005) and Castilla (2005) are notable exceptions. 
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to-face interaction of evaluators and job applicants. The reason underlying 
publicity is that Spanish civil service prides itself on being entirely merit-
based and as such, presumably welcoming of popular scrutiny. A second 
important pillar of civil service recruitment’s merit-based foundation is 
that applicants are selected by committees, it is never the case that a single 
evaluator is entrusted with the selection of applicants. This feature ensures 
that hiring does not rely on the idiosyncrasy a single individual.  
This project focuses on a specific competition, Administradores 
Civiles del Estado (henceforth, ACE), which consists of four qualifying 
rounds of testing; applicants who succeed at round four are automatically 
hired and become permanent civil servants.  
The first part of this research analyzes quantitative exam data 
gathered using open Internet sources. I use status characteristics theory to 
understand why women score higher than men in some exams (i.e. exam 
2) but not in others (i.e. exam 3). In the ACE competition exams are 
highly similar but differ in two important aspects that are theory-relevant. 
The purpose of this section is twofold. First, some exams evaluate female-
typed skills while others assess masculine or neutral abilities. I assess 
whether status characteristics theory adequately explains the actual 
competition outcome. Do women score lower in exams that evaluate 
masculine/neutral abilities? Do women enjoy an advantage relative to 
men when the skills to be assessed are female-typed?  
Second, although all exams involve the direct interaction of judges 
and applicants, exams differ in the degree of structure of such 
interactions. In some exams applicant-judge interactions are rigid and 
minimal (i.e. exam 1 and 4) while in others applicants and judges engage 
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in a fairly natural dialogue (i.e. exam 3). Ridgeway (1997) has argued that 
mixed-sex interaction will prompt sex-categorization, which will in turn 
activate the use of gender status beliefs to guide attitudes and behavior 
(Ridgeway 1997). Other scholars have noted how ambiguity facilitates the 
influence of gendered expectations on evaluations (Heilman & Parks-
Stamm 2007); vagueness create gaps that are susceptible to be filled with 
gendered subjectivity (Nieva & Gutek 1980) so that information fits a 
preconceived (thus preferred) outcome (Fiske & Taylor 1991).  
Considering these various approaches, I argue that the degree of 
structure of judge-applicant interactions will impact the extent to which 
gender status beliefs will be acted upon by individuals in the setting. In 
other words, contexts where applicants and evaluators interact more freely 
(i.e. engage in an actual conversation) will disadvantage female applicants 
more than situations where interaction is direct but minimal or more 
structured. The proposed rationale is that interactive settings that are less-
structured leave it to individuals’ choosing whether or not to exercise 
behaviors based on their gendered expectations. Conversely, highly 
structured contexts serve to constrain or limit individuals’ unconscious 
impulses to act on their gender beliefs. I argue (and provide empirical 
support) that classifying exams by their degree of structure is useful to 
understand the magnitude of SCT predictions.  
The second part of this work builds on the main findings of part one 
and takes an in-depth look at what happens during the Q&A (Questions 
and Answers) portion of exam 3. I use double standards theory to evaluate 
whether specific behaviors of judges and applicants permit substantiating 
the experimental finding that men and women are assessed according to 
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different criteria even when they provide the same evidence of ability. I 
audio-taped and transcribed 83 Q&A sessions and hired two expert coders 
to obtain objective measures of the quality of applicants’ answers and the 
difficulty of judges’ questions.  
Since judges’ performance expectations are not directly observable, 
I measured behaviors (i.e. judges’ interruptions) that reveal some of the 
cognitive processes taking place as judges evaluate applicants. Similarly, I 
measured various applicants’ behaviors such as pauses and speech 
duration, which provide information about the quality and style of 
applicants’ capacities.  
In this work I try to take a fresh approach to the study of gender 
segregation by examining a novel setting with a magnifying lens. The 
main goal of this project is to help us gain an in-depth understanding of 
whether and how women are disadvantaged in the hiring process. Second, 
this work represents a two-fold methodological contribution: (i) first I use  
the method of conversation analysis to understand gender dynamics in a 
real world context; (ii) second, this is one of the first applications of 
experimentally established theory to a natural setting, as such this work 
illustrates how mechanisms found in controlled environments operate in 
much less structured contexts.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
PRIOR RESEARCH 
 
Gender segregation in employment refers to the unequal 
distribution of men and women across industries and jobs. Occupational 
sex segregation is a major source of labor market rigidity and economic 
inefficiency (Anker 1997). In addition, the asymmetrical distribution of 
male and female workers across occupations is associated with a broad 
range of workplace inequalities. First, occupational segregation is a major 
cause of the gender gap in wages and benefits. Second, female-typed jobs 
offer fewer promotion and on-the-job training opportunities (Farkas et al. 
1991). Third, gender segregation in employment not only reflects 
hegemonic gender beliefs but also it contributes to perpetuate them 
(Ridgeway 1997).  
Although the proportion of men and women in the labor force is 
approaching parity, survey data suggest that there is still substantial 
segregation across occupations, organizations, and industries (Anker 
1997; Reskin 1993). Furthermore, recent studies claim that occupational 
segregation contributes substantially to the gender pay gap (Blau & Kahn 
2006; Petersen & Morgan 1995). Since it is well-established that female 
workers earn less because they are more likely to fill positions that offer 
lower economic rewards, it is important to examine the processes that are 
preventing women from accessing the best jobs.   
 
Supply Side & Demand Side Explanations 
 Explanations of the sources of occupational sex segregation are 
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typically categorized into two major approaches, namely supply and 
demand. Generally speaking, supply-side theories argue that men and 
women end up filling up different jobs as a result of their different 
preferences, natural abilities, rational investments, or biased self-
assessments. In other words, since men and women are (or think they are) 
dissimilar, and confront different obligations, they are naturally, 
rationally, and culturally oriented toward different occupations.  
For example, Becker’s supply side argument is that men and 
women make differential investments in human capital in an effort to 
maximize income. Becker’s human-capital theory argues that employees 
are rewarded for the value of the additional productivity brought about by 
their investments in skills. The author argues that the need for labor 
market specialization provides a strong incentive for a division of labor, 
which leads men and women to invest more in the areas where they each 
have a comparative advantage – labor market and household respectively.  
As a result, working women rationally save on labor-market effort by 
seeking jobs that require less human capital investment (Becker 1985). 
A more sophisticated example of supply-side mechanism is one 
developed by Correll (2001, 2004) in an effort to move away from the 
overly simple gender socialization and rationality approaches. The author 
argues that widely shared cultural beliefs about gender and task 
competence differentially bias how men and women evaluate their own 
competence at career-relevant tasks. According to Correll this bias is the 
result of the internalization of a cultural belief about gender and a given 
skill into one's identity, or the expectation that other individuals will think 
this way (Correll 2001, 2004). In other words, existing beliefs about 
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gender lead women to use stricter standards to evaluate their own 
competence at male-typed abilities; these inaccurate self assessments will 
in turn influence women’s career orientations and aspirations, and 
ultimately the jobs they pursue.  
Demand side explanations contend that factors beyond employees 
can also lead to gender segregation. These factors include but are not 
limited to discrimination and rational employers’ decisions2. However, the 
remainder of this chapter will focus on empirical evidence supporting the 
discrimination argument, which in some ways challenges rationality-type 
explanations.  
Gender segregation is, at least partially, the result of aggregate 
individual gender-based judgments (Perry, Davis-Blake & Kulik 1994). 
Thus, some demand-side approaches to segregation focus on the role of 
employers’ judgments in hiring and promotion. The economic perspective 
focuses on rationality and tries to explain why it is advantageous for 
employers to make the choices they make when recruiting and promoting 
job applicants – e.g. statistical discrimination theory by Phelps (1972) and 
Arrow (1973). Conversely, the status based perspective draws on the 
notion that human behavior and decisions are not merely rational nor 
agentic. While economic theories such as statistical discrimination assume 
the source of bias leading employers to prefer one group over another is 
informational, status discrimination theories assume the source of bias is 
cognitive. In statistical discrimination models, employers are perfectly 
rational and maximize expected utility. Bias enters hiring and wage 
                                                
2 For example, Fernández and Sosa (2005) evaluate the extent to which network-based 
hiring practices (i.e. referrals) affect the demand for female and male workers.  
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decisions through external constraints (i.e. lack of information) but is not 
inherent in them. In contrast, status discrimination theories assume that 
actors’ cognitive abilities are limited (see Correll & Benard 2006).  
 
Stereotype & Status-Based Discrimination 
 Scholars have argued that it is the unequal treatment and 
evaluation of men and women by employers that produces biased hiring 
decisions resulting in the patterns of gender segregation observed at a 
macro-level. According to this view, it is not the case that men and 
women are so different; rather individuals are perceived and assessed 
differently based on their ascribed characteristics.  
Gender stereotypes can be about what men and women are (i.e. 
descriptive) or about what men and women should be (i.e. prescriptive). 
Both properties affect how women are evaluated and treated in career-
relevant settings (see Heilman & Parks-Stamm 2007). Specifically, 
stereotypes disadvantage women in employment contexts by hindering 
their efforts to achieve status in the workplace. Women are often caught 
up in a double bind since displaying the competencies required for top 
level jobs is culturally framed as incompatible with femininity (Heilman 
2001; Heilman & Parks-Stamm 2007).  
Descriptive stereotypes about women create the expectation that 
women are unlikely to be successful at male-typed jobs; these 
performance expectations influence the way information about individuals 
is processed. Specifically, expectations affect what information about an 
individual is attended to, how it is interpreted, and what it is recalled 
when evaluations and decisions are made in the workplace. Thus, 
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expectations can create gender bias in evaluative judgments at the point of 
hiring and subsequent career relevant situations (Heilman 1995, 2001). 
Expectations promote the view that women are unfit for a job, and as such 
unlikely to succeed at it. Thus, stereotype-based performance expectations 
directly affect women’s chances of being recruited or promoted into male-
typed positions.  
Gender status theories argue that discrimination arises because 
generalized beliefs about the relative performance capacity of men and 
women influence evaluations of workers. Although these are not theories 
of labor market discrimination per se, SCT and DST make predictions 
about when and how women will be discriminated against in hiring, 
salary, and promotion decisions. The key notion in status-based 
discrimination is that employers’ assessment of future employees will be 
shaped by shared beliefs determining that a category of the social 
distinction (e.g. for gender, males) has more value than the other (e.g. 
female). Thus, employers will implicitly anticipate superior performances 
from male job applicants than for their female counterparts and 
subsequent evaluations will be biased in favor of men.  
Research has empirically supported the existence of gender bias in 
employee selection processes (see Davidson & Burke 2000) with male 
applicants generally recommended for hire and seen as more likely to 
succeed than female applicants with identical credentials. Studies have 
shown that despite producing identical work, a woman’s work is often 
regarded as inferior. Research in organizational psychology found that 
unless the quality of the work product is incontrovertible, women’s 
accomplishments are undervalued (Heilman 1995). 
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Various studies have proved that group members often hold lower 
performance expectations for women than men (Berger, Rosenholtz, & 
Zelditch 1980; Lockheed & Hall 1976; Meeker & Weitzel-O’Neil 1977) 
and give women fewer opportunities to participate than men (Meeker & 
Weitzel-O’Neil 1985; Ridgeway & Berger 1986). Similarly, other works 
demonstrate that equally competent performance by men and women is 
perceived as more indicative of skill and ability in men than in women 
(Deaux & Emswiller 1974; Foschi, Lai, & Siegerson 1994). For example, 
Deaux and Emswiller (1974) showed that a successful performance is not 
treated as very informative of a woman’s competence; rather, her success 
is explained away by factors unrelated to her capacities (i.e. luck).  
The use of different standards to evaluate men and women’s 
competence has been confirmed in a variety of settings (see Foschi 2000). 
For instance, in an experiment Foschi and colleagues (1994) recreated 
features of a hiring decision that involved the examination of files of 
fictitious applicants for professional jobs. Subjects had to make a 
recommendation about hiring the fictitious male or female applicant. 
Although female participants did not display the use of double standards, 
the results from male participants indicated otherwise. For male subjects, 
fictitious male applicants were preferred when they were slightly more 
qualified, but fictitious female applicants did not enjoy the same 
advantage when they had slightly better qualifications (Foschi, Lai, & 
Siegerson 1994). Other studies suggest that both men and women rate the 
quality of men’s work higher than that of women’s work when they are 
aware of the sex of the person to be evaluated, but not when the person’s 
gender is unknown (O’Leary & Wallston 1982).  
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In an audit study, Steinpreis and colleagues (1999) examined 
whether faculty would be influenced by the gender of the name on a CV 
in determining hireability and tenurability. Fictitious CVs were submitted 
to real academics. Both male and female faculty were significantly more 
likely to hire a potential male colleague than an equally qualified potential 
female colleague. In addition, both male and female faculty were more 
likely to positively evaluate the research, teaching, and service 
contributions of male job applicants than that of female job applicants 
with identical records (Steinpreis, Anders, & Ritzke 1999). Interestingly, 
participants in Steinpreis study were four times as likely to write down 
cautionary comments when reviewing the CV of a fictitious female tenure 
candidate than when reviewing CVs of fictitious males. Comments 
included notes such as “we would have to see her job-talk”, “it is 
impossible to see such a judgment without teaching evaluations”, or “I 
would have to see evidence that she had gotten these grants and 
publications on her own”.  
Using a similar methodology, Neumark (1996) conducted a study 
in which male and female fictitious job seekers were given similar CVs 
and were sent to apply for jobs waiting on tables at the same group of 
restaurants. In top restaurants, the female applicant’s probability of 
getting a job offer was 50% below that of the male (Neumark 1996).  
Another study examined the impact of the adoption of blind 
auditions by symphony orchestras where a screen is used to hide the 
identity of the performer (Goldin & Rouse 2000). The authors confirmed 
that the screen increased the probability that a woman would be selected. 
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The switch to blind auditions in 1996 accounted for 25% of the increase 
in the percentage female in the top five symphony orchestras in the US.  
Negative evaluations in selection processes have been found to 
occur particularly for male-typed jobs (Davison & Burke 2000). There are 
similar findings in investigations concerning competence assessments and 
performance evaluations. For example, a study on performance 
evaluations in a large multinational financial services company 
demonstrated that women were rated less favorably than men in line jobs 
but not in staff jobs (Lyness & Heilman 2006).  
Thomas-Hunt and Phillips (2004) found that women (who were 
equally qualified as men) were perceived by others as less expert than 
men, were less influential, and felt less confident about their impact on the 
group. Their results support the notion that the possession of expert 
knowledge is likely to be more beneficial for men than for women. The 
authors’ findings suggest that women are penalized when they possess the 
same expertise as men (Thomas-Hunt & Phillips 2004).  
As can be gathered from the discussion above most studies of 
gender bias in the selection process are done in controlled or semi-
controlled settings. These studies can be viewed as alternatives to more 
traditional approaches to the study of discrimination. For example, a 
classic approach that examines discrimination indirectly is one that 
analyzes the sources of the gender wage gap by trying to account for as 
many as possible productivity-related characteristics for men and women. 
The pay gap is statistically decomposed into two components: one due to 
gender differences in measured characteristics, and the other unexplained 
and presumably due to discrimination. But any approach that relies on a 
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statistical residual is open to the question of whether all the relevant 
explanatory variables were included in the model (Heilman & Parks-
Stamm 2007). An additional problem that other authors have noted is that 
studies using data on individuals who already have jobs cannot adequately 
identify mechanisms such as discrimination which occur prior to getting 
hired (Fernández & Sosa 2005). By contrast, social psychological 
experiments have made important contributions to explaining why 
employers might prefer men over women to fill the best jobs. Although 
cognitive approaches do not directly analyze occupational segregation, 
they examine processes that have clear implications for it.  
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CHAPTER THREE  
THEORY 
 
This work relies on various theories of the expectation states 
research program, an on going line of analysis that explains how 
structures of inequality emerge, are maintained, and translate into material 
and nonmaterial advantages for certain social groups (Correll & 
Ridgeway 2003). Expectation states theory offers an all-inclusive 
explanation to situations felt and described by socially devalued groups – 
i.e. feeling ignored or overridden in discussions with others. These small 
inequalities that emerge in interaction have important cumulative effects. 
Thus, it is crucial to understand how preconceived expectations for high 
and low status group members develop and influence social interaction.  
Expectation states theory explains the formation of status 
hierarchies in contexts where individuals are compelled to solve a 
problem or achieve a goal in a group. In other words, the theory holds in 
collective and task oriented situations. A key notion is that such situations 
make it necessary and useful for actors to take into account other group 
members’ contributions, which in turn compels actors to predict and 
weight the relative quality of others’ suggestions. The setting where I 
apply this theory and its extensions meets these scope conditions in 
several respects. First, exam judges’ are entrusted with the task of 
selecting the best performing applicants; thus, evaluators will consider 
how each applicant measures against other applicants and/or against their 
abstract notion of competent or deserving applicant. Thus, judges are 
motivated to anticipate applicants performances so as to assist and 
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economize their decision-making process. Applicants are similarly task-
oriented insofar as they are aware job spots are limited and only the best 
performers will be selected. Thus applicants are in direct competition with 
all other examinees and, understandably, are highly compelled to 
demonstrate their superiority relative to others. Furthermore, as will be 
explained later in this chapter, EST and its different branches have, in 
more recent developments, relaxed some of the specifications under 
which EST predictions are argued to be correct leaving no doubt that the 
selected setting meets the theory’s scope conditions.  
Expectation states theory argues that individuals form expectations 
about the relative competence of group members to contribute to a shared 
goal. When performance expectations for a group member are high, the 
person will enjoy a series of privileges in social interaction (Berger et al. 
1972). Performance expectations are unconscious anticipations that are 
shaped by a variety of factors such as (1) socially significant or status 
characteristics, (2) social rewards, and (3) behavioral patterns. I will 
discuss these factors in detail in the following paragraphs.  
 
Status Characteristics Theory 
High or low expectations largely originate in attributes such as race 
or gender for which there are broadly shared cultural beliefs. More 
formally, status characteristics are categorical distinctions among people; 
different categories (e.g. for gender, male and female) have attached to 
them hegemonic beliefs associating greater status and competence to one 
category (i.e. men) of the distinction and not the other/s (i.e. women) 
(Berger et al. 1977, 1972).  
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Status characteristics theory describes how socially meaningful 
distinctions lead to inequalities in rates of participation, influence on 
others, and evaluations of task competence. According to SCT, actors 
implicitly expect superior performances from those with the more valued 
state of a characteristic (e.g. men) relative to those with the less valued 
state (e.g. women). Performance expectations have a self fulfilling 
component; they bias information processing as means of maintaining 
themselves. Thus, performance expectations affect what evidence is 
attended to and recalled, and how that evidence is interpreted when 
making decisions about individuals. Since high status actors are expected 
to offer more competent performances, they receive more opportunities to 
make contributions, have more influence on others and have their 
performances evaluated more positively (Correll & Ridgeway 2003). 
To understand how generalized cultural beliefs function, it is useful 
to contrast them with stereotypes. Separating individuals into 
differentiated social categories encourages preference toward one’s own 
group (Brewer & Brown 1998). Conversely, status beliefs are “social 
representations that consensually evaluate one category as more status 
worthy and competent than the other” (Correll & Ridgeway 2003, p. 32). 
This means that even though socially devalued groups such as women 
may favor their own group (i.e. other women), they will also be aware of 
and accept, or at least concede, men’s superior social status (Ridgeway & 
Erickson 2000). Thus, gender status beliefs reflect a cultural system 
representing what we think most people accept as true about men and 
women (Deaux & Kite 1987). Because status beliefs function as schemas 
(Ridgeway 1997), even those who do not personally endorse their content 
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(i.e. many individuals may disagree that men are better than women at 
math) are likely to be aware of their existence and thus have their 
judgment and behavior influenced by them (Foschi 1996; Lovaglia et al. 
1998; Ridgeway & Correll 2004; Steele 1997). While the specific content 
of gender beliefs can differ across contexts and cultures, their status 
component ensures that greater value will be attached to the superior 
category (i.e. men) but not the other/s (Conway et al. 1996).  
There are five assumptions that connect status beliefs to behavior 
(Balkwell, 1991) and these are (a) salience, (b) burden of proof, (c) 
sequencing, (d) aggregation, and (e) observable behavior. Next, I turn to a 
discussion of these five tenets.   
The salience premise states that for any attribute (e.g. class, gender, 
race) to impact performance expectations, the attribute must be important 
for actors in the setting. A status characteristic becomes important or 
salient when it differentiates individuals in a given context or when the 
characteristic is perceived to be related to the task. For instance, gender is 
salient whenever men and women interact. Gender would also be salient 
in a context where a group of women work on a task requiring verbal 
ability, a stereotypically female skill. Thus, specific contexts and their 
social composition shape how status characteristics affect performance 
expectations. The same characteristic (e.g. fluency in a foreign language) 
can be an advantage to an actor in one setting (e.g. a group of 
monolingual speakers), have no impact in another (e.g. a group of 
bilingual people), and be a disadvantage in a third context (e.g. a group 
where all members are native speakers). Importantly, this implies that no 
status characteristic advantages or disadvantages an actor in all settings.  
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Salient status characteristics have been shown to impact attitudes 
and behavior in collective and goal oriented situations. Later advances of 
the theory have demonstrated that status characteristics shape behavior in 
a broader range of social contexts than originally specified by the theory’s 
scope conditions. In fact, status characteristics have been shown to matter 
in all contexts where actors are compelled to anticipate their own behavior 
relative to others and/or the behavior of others (Lovaglia et al. 1998; 
Steele 1997; Foschi, Lai & Sigerson 1994; Correll 2004). Researchers 
have relaxed the collective orientation condition because the logic of the 
theory only requires that some feature of the setting encourages actors to 
predict the relative value of their own or others’ contributions. For 
example, pressure to measure oneself against abstract others can also 
appear when actors are in individual evaluative settings (e.g. Correll 2004; 
Erickson 1998; Lovaglia et al. 1998; Steele 1997) and, when actors are 
evaluators but not performers (Foschi, Lai & Sigerson 1994). In terms of 
the Spanish civil service exams, evaluators may not be collectively 
oriented when assessing applicants, but they certainly are compelled to 
anticipate prospective applicants’ relative performances. Since the civil 
service applicant pool is heterogeneous in terms of gender, status beliefs 
will encourage the use of different ability standards for male and female 
applicants; this in turn will lead to higher evaluations of men.  
Second, the burden of proof assumption tells us that actors’ default 
response is to assume salient status characteristics are relevant to the task 
at hand. The challenge consists on showing that a salient status 
characteristic is irrelevant and should not be taken into account when 
anticipating others’ performances. In other words, something in the 
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setting needs to explicitly dissociate the status characteristic from the task; 
otherwise, individuals will behave as if the characteristic matters. For 
these reasons, diffuse status characteristics such as gender have limited 
but omnipresent effects across a multiple contexts even when they are not 
directly related to the task.  
Third, the sequencing assumption specifies that performance 
expectations formed in one encounter carry over to the next, even if the 
individuals in the encounter change. For example, if a man interacts with 
a woman who displays greater task competence than he does, this 
encounter can positively impact the performance expectations the man 
forms for women in future interactions (Pugh & Wahrman 1983). For 
these reasons, gender scholars have identified interactional settings as 
contexts where inequalities can be created but also where social change 
can occur (Ridgeway & Correll 2000). 
Fourth, individuals in groups typically differ in more than one 
status characteristic, the aggregation assumption examines how the 
information associated with multiple characteristics is combined to form 
aggregated performance expectations. Multiple status characteristics often 
generate inconsistent expectations for performance – e.g. male nurse. SCT 
offers a method for incorporating all salient status information to 
determine the performance expectations group members will form. A nice 
feature of my civil service context is that individuals do not generally 
differ in other important status attributes such as nationality, ethnicity, age 
and so forth. If this were not the case, it would be difficult to argue that 
gender alone is causing the observed outcomes. In this sense, the setting I 
examine, although not controlled in a strict sense, is highly structured  and 
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additionally has the important advantage of being a natural context with 
real consequences for actors.  
The fifth assumption describes how performance expectations  
which are unobservable translate into tangible behaviors. The higher the 
performance expectations of one actor over another, the more likely the 
first actor will be to receive opportunities to participate and take such 
opportunities. Also, higher status actors will have their performances 
evaluated more positively and will command more influence over others. 
In my setting, I argue that evaluators’ expectations will be revealed by a 
series of behaviors; it is useful to view the behaviors I selected and 
measured as specific illustrations of the more general behavioral 
predictions above.  For example, measuring when judges interrupt 
applicants constitutes a denial of an opportunity to participate for 
applicants.  In fact, since interruptions are negative sanctions administered 
in front of other evaluators their effects may also impact other judges’ 
performance expectations.  
At the beginning of this chapter I noted that, in addition to status 
attributes, reward distributions can have independent effects in shaping 
the performance expectations of actors in a setting. Several scholars have 
shown that when group members are given differential rewards, they use 
the reward differences to infer ability differences. For example, Stewart 
and Moore (1992) showed that allocating differential pay levels to 
participants in an experiment generated influence structures among them 
during interaction. These results highlight how the unequal possession of 
valued goods generates status distinctions. In the civil service exam 
setting that will be described in thoroughly in Chapter 4, judges do not 
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administer rewards but sanctions (i.e. interruptions). It seems reasonable 
to assume that penalties work in the same manner. Succinctly, applicants 
who receive more interruptions may come to be viewed as deserving such 
penalties. Thus, other judges may infer lower ability from the unequal 
distribution of interruptions.  
Finally, a third factor that can have independent effects on 
performance expectations is the behavioral patterns that develop among 
two or more actors. A variety of assertive verbal and nonverbal cues (e.g. 
sitting at the head of the table, having an upright, relaxed posture, 
speaking up with a confident tone, maintaining eye contact) have been 
shown to make a person’s ideas sound better and increase influence (see 
Dovidio & Ellyson 1985; Ridgeway 1987). In diverse groups, actors’ 
status characteristics determine behavioral interchange patterns (Smith-
Lovin & Brody 1989). This is relevant to my research because I measured 
and examined behaviors such as interruptions, pauses, and speech 
duration. Interrupting is a leader-type behavior and thus will be enacted 
more often by men and directed usually at women.   
 
Double Standards Theory 
Double standards theory (DST) extends SCT to propose that status 
characteristics also affect the standards individuals use to determine if a 
given performance is indicative of ability (Foschi 1989). There are two 
processes involved in the use of double standards. First, status 
characteristics distinguish actors in the setting – i.e. a mixed-sex setting. 
Second, the available evidence indicates that individuals from both groups 
possess a given attribute to similar extents. Double standards are the 
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practice of using different criteria to interpret similar evidence.  
DST argues that stricter standards are applied to members of 
devalued groups and, as a result, conclusions about the extent to which 
they posses the attribute based on the available proof are reinterpreted 
through a sort of lens. A strict standard for ability requires more evidence 
of competence than does a lenient standard. Conversely, a strict standard 
for lack of ability tolerates less evidence of incompetence than does a soft 
standard (Biernat & Kobrynowicz 1997; Foschi 1989).  
When high status individuals (e.g. men) perform well, evaluators’ 
expectations are met and there is no cognitive dissonance that might need 
resolving. When low status individuals (e.g. women) perform well, the 
opposite happens; good performance appears inconsistent with what was 
anticipated. Thus, evaluators’ will tend to doubt women’s competence and 
will further scrutinize it (Foschi, 1996; Foschi, Lai & Sigerson 1994).  
The notes at the margins of the fictitious female CVs in Steinpreis 
and colleagues’ study (1999) (see Chapter 2) may not provide sufficient 
data for a standard statistical test. Nonetheless, these cautionary 
comments mentioned by the author reflect a qualitatively important 
finding, namely that identical evidence provided by male and female 
applicants is interpreted based on different criteria. Essentially, 
information contained in women’s CVs is not fully trusted; the 
performances of low status actors—even when objectively equal to that of 
their high status counterparts—are less likely to be judged as 
demonstrating competence. Empirical evidence supports these predictions 
for gender in contexts where individuals evaluate others and when they 
evaluate themselves (Foschi 1996; Correll 2001, 2004). 
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Outside the expectation states framework, the research by Biernat 
and colleagues on stereotypes and shifting standards is also relevant (see 
Biernat & Fuegen 2001; Biernat & Kobrynowicz 1997). The core idea of 
their work is that standards change as a function of who is being evaluated 
but also that different conditions result in either a more lenient or a stricter 
standard for low status groups (Biernat & Kobrynowicz 1997; Biernat & 
Fuegen 2001). For example, the authors argue that a more lenient standard 
of ability for women would result if a specific woman is compared against 
other women on a given dimension (i.e. within category comparisons). 
According to Biernat and associates, it is often the case that individuals 
have lower minimum standards for women and other devalued groups, 
and higher confirmatory standards for men and high status groups in 
general. Biernat and Fuegen (2001) found that in a simulated hiring 
context women were more likely to be short listed in the selection process 
but that male applicants were more likely to be hired (Biernat & Fuegen 
2001). The authors conclude that lower minimum standards for women 
make it easier for them to pass an initial screening process but that higher 
confirmatory standards make it more difficult for them to pass the 
scrutiny required to be hired (Biernat & Fuegen 2001).  I will discuss the 
implications of the shifting standard model in my context when I provide 
related concrete hypotheses (Chapter 5).  
When gender is salient in goal oriented settings, SCT and DST 
predict that men will have an advantage over women because they will be 
expected to perform better. Provided that a context is not female typed, 
higher performance expectations for men lead to three main theoretical 
predictions: (1) men will be given more opportunities to participate or 
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make a contribution, (2) men will have their mistakes judged by more 
lenient standards; stricter standards will be used for women, and (3) men 
will have their performances evaluated more positively than women. 
Experiments confirm that a number of status characteristics, including 
race, gender, and level of education systematically organize the 
appearance of competence, influence and deference (Lovaglia et al. 1998; 
Ridgeway 2001).  
 
Degree of Structure in Interaction 
Although a setting needs not involve direct interaction for gender 
status theory predictions to operate, Ridgeway (1997) has argued that 
relating to a concrete other is sufficient to trigger gender status processes. 
Ridgeway (1997) understands social interaction as a complex 
phenomenon that requires to be simplified before it can be coordinated. 
Simplification begins to occur when individuals develop a minimal 
definition of who “self” and “other” are in a given context; preliminary 
definitions are reached by contrasting self and other on dimensions where 
similarities and differences are perceived to exist. Empirical evidence 
demonstrates that sex serves as a primary categorization system in 
Western society (Fiske 1992) and that individuals automatically and 
unconsciously sex categorize any specific other to whom they relate 
(Brewer & Lui 1989; Stangor et al. 1992). Subsequent categorizations 
such as occupational roles become nested in gender (Brewer & Lui 1989), 
taking on slightly different meanings as a result. Most importantly, sex 
categorization prompts the use of gender stereotypes (including status 
beliefs) to guide attitudes and behavior (Blair & Banaji 1996).   
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Heilman and Parks-Stamm (2007) have argued that “the more 
ambiguity there is in a given context, the more inference is required for 
evaluation, and the less guidance there is about the correct outcome of an 
evaluation” (Heilman & Parks-Stamm 2007, p. 54).  The authors’ 
argument is that ambiguity creates gaps that can be filled with gender 
biased subjectivity (Nieva & Gutek 1980) so that information fits a 
preferred outcome (Fiske & Taylor 1991).  
From the concepts briefly outlined above, I make the following 
elaboration: contexts involving less structured interactions will encourage 
actors to use gender status beliefs to a greater extent. Thus, while SCT 
predictions will work regardless of the level of structure in judge-
applicant interactions, I argue that the magnitude of these predictions will 
be greater when actors interact more naturally and freely than when they 
do so in more rigid or scripted ways3.  
Other scholars such as Mueller and colleagues have attempted to 
better define interaction and have proposed to operationalize the concept 
as a continuous measure (see Mueller, Mulinge, & Glass 2002). The 
authors understanding of degree of interaction (i.e. as frequency or rate; 
see Mueller, Mulinge, & Glass 2002) is quite distant from the approach I 
take in this work.  I have argued that although all testing rounds involve 
the face to face interaction of evaluators and applicants, exams differ in 
the degree of structure of  applicant-judge interactions. Degree does not 
refer to duration, frequency, or rate; rather a greater or lesser degree of 
interactional structure is accorded as a function of qualitative aspects 
                                                
3  Ridgeway (1997) makes this point but mine is a more explicit discussion and will 
provide empirical support.  
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characterizing the exchange. Degree refers to the level of structure (or 
lack of structure) of applicant-judge conversations. A highly structured 
interaction is one governed by explicit rules. In these situations actors’ 
behaviors are limited by a series of norms which presumably substitute 
and prevent the use of more personal criteria on which to base their 
behaviors. Since individuals’ attitudes and actions are often shaped by 
preconceptions based on status beliefs and stereotypes, it could be argued 
that low status actors benefit when the rules of interaction are more 
explicit. Conversely, in other more informal types of face-to-face 
encounters actors’ behaviors are less constrained and as such, they are 
more likely to reflect actors’ assumptions and prejudices. In less 
structured or more interactional contexts, low status actors are often at a 
disadvantage because there will be more opportunities for others to treat 
them according to the performance expectations they hold for them.  
I argue that in less structured interactions, allowed and prohibited 
behaviors are not clearly defined. Thus, it is up to the individual to fill this 
vacuum, and actors will exercise such freedom in a gender biased manner. 
Thus, if evaluators have implicit preferences for male applicants, a less 
structured setting will enable evaluators to behave in ways consistent with 
these beliefs. In other words actors’ status information combined with 
structural characteristics of the setting (i.e. more or less degree of 
structure in interactions) means more biased behaviors are likely to 
surface. For example, in a formal presentation audience members may 
think the speaker is not doing a good job and may feel compelled to 
correct or interrupt. But it is possible that the rules of the setting prevent 
audience members from doing so – i.e. questions or suggestions may only 
28 
be asked at the end. Conversely, contexts where interaction is less 
structured like an informal presentation may lack concrete rules. In the 
absence of explicit protocol, audience members will use their own criteria 
to orient their behavior. The gender and status literature suggests that 
audience members will be more forgiving with a male speaker (i.e. will 
not interrupt, fidget, display impatience) than with a female speaker, even 
when the two are equally competent/incompetent.   
Because mine is a novel setting and as such, unfamiliar to most 
readers, in the next chapter (i.e. Chapter 4) I will provide a thorough 
description of the context of the study. Chapters 5 and 7 will offer specific 
hypotheses for the two analytical parts of this work.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CONTEXT  
 
This research relies on theories which rest on the notion that widely 
held beliefs about gender exist and are used constantly to organize social 
relations. The specific content of gender beliefs is not presumed to be 
constant across cultures4; nonetheless, a key aspect of these theories is 
that greater status is always associated only with a category of a social 
distinction and not the others. For instance, in Spain men may not be 
perceived to  be naturally good at math like it is the case in the US5 but 
rather, at negotiation. While the specific content of beliefs is different (i.e. 
mathematical vs. negotiation skills), both aptitudes are socially desirable. 
What gender status theories argue is that high status actors (i.e. men) will 
be perceived to possess socially valued abilities (whatever these are) to a 
greater extent than low status actors (i.e. women).  This means that if a 
new ability becomes socially valued, individuals will be inclined to 
associate such ability to high status groups such as men, whites, the 
educated and so forth.  
In this section I will justify the claim that men enjoy greater social 
status in Spain like in many other societies. First, I will examine empirical 
evidence substantiating that gender-role attitudes in Spain are similar to 
those existing in the United States and Europe. Second, I will offer a 
                                                
4 Nonetheless research has demonstrated that gender stereotypes are very consistent 
across time and cultures (Williams & Best 1990) and that they are pervasive, widely 
shared, and very resistant to change (Dodge, Gilroy & Fenzel 1995). 
5 See Correll 2001 for a  review of the cultural association men-math ability and the 
absence of actual differences between men and women’s mathematical ability in the 
United States.  
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description of the context and specific setting of this study. This 
description will be extended in chapters five and seven, which will specify 
hypotheses for the two distinct analytical sections of this work.   
 
Gender Beliefs in Comparative Perspective  
Chapter 3 discussed that hegemonic gender beliefs accord men 
greater status worthiness than women, and explained how individuals use 
these cultural schemas constantly in their assessment of social situations 
and subsequent behavior. Thus, both status characteristics and double 
standards theory elucidate how shared and deeply rooted beliefs about 
gender translate into tangible hurdles and disadvantages for devalued 
groups in areas as crucial as education and employment.  
In the following paragraphs, I will examine and discuss empirical 
evidence suggesting that gender-role attitudes in Spain resemble those 
that exist in the United States and elsewhere in Europe6. I analyzed data 
from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), which is a 
collaboration among a total of 41 nations which conduct harmonized 
surveys about topics of ample interest for social science research. I 
examined a set of attitudinal survey items of the 2002 module on gender 
attitudes; this analysis will help support the notion that men are higher 
status relative to women in Spain. My general argument is that in Spanish 
society, like in many others, men are considered to be better than women 
at the things that matter (i.e. men are higher status than women).   
                                                
6 Europe includes EU15 member states (except Greece, Belgium, and Luxemburg, 
which were not surveyed for gender attitudes in 2002), Norway, and Switzerland.  
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A total of 2,471 respondents from Spain and 19,309 from Europe 
and the US combined participated in the ISSP module on gender attitudes 
in 2002. Respondents were asked to rate a series of statements on 5-point 
scales where 1 was “strongly agree” and 5 was “strongly disagree”. Below 
I present some descriptive results concerning respondents’ attitudes 
toward men and women’s perceived roles and preferences.  
 
Table 1 ISSP Survey Results on Gender Attitudes in Spain and 
the United States & Europe, 2002 
 
Strongly Agree/Agree That… Spain US/Europe  
    
Children suffer if mother works 52%1 43%  
N 1,253 7,984  
Mean2 2.84 3.00  
Family life suffers if women work 54% 41%  
N 1,331 7,711  
Mean 2.75 3.05  
What women really want is 
home/children 42 34  
N 984 6,073  
Mean 3.07 3.20  
Women’s place is the household 24 19  
N 601 2,977  
Mean 3.61 3.72  
1 Percentage of respondents who answered “strongly agree” or “agree”.  
2 Where 1= strongly agree and 5= strongly disagree.  
 
About 32% (N=785) of Spaniards believe that working mothers 
cannot have a warm relationship with their children. About 21% 
(N=3,964) of respondents shared this view in other European countries 
and the US combined. Similarly, approximately 52% (N=1,253) of 
32 
Spanish respondents agreed or strongly agreed that children suffer if their 
mother works outside the home. About 43% (N=7,984) of respondents in 
Europe and the US answered likewise. In the same vein, 54% (N=1,331) 
of respondents in Spain agree or strongly agree that family life suffers if 
women work outside the home. About 41% (N=7,711) of respondents in 
Europe and the US answered the same.  
Regarding the perception of women’s preferences and aspirations, 
42% (N=991) of Spanish respondents agreed that what women “really 
want” is to stay home and take care of their children. About 34% 
(N=6,073) of US and European respondents shared the same views. 
Roughly 24% (N=601) of Spaniards agreed that men’s job is outside the 
home and women’s job is in the household.  In the US and Europe 
combined, 19% (N=2,977) of respondents answered likewise.  
Table 1 summarizes the results discussed. Percentages represent the 
proportion of respondents who “strongly agreed” or “agreed” with the 
statements on the left hand column (i.e. “Children suffer if mother 
works”). Table 1 also shows the mean values for both Spanish and 
US/European respondents. Higher values indicate less agreement with the 
statements on the left (i.e. 1=“strongly agree” and 5=“strongly disagree”).  
From this examination of gender role attitudes, it seems that 
generalized beliefs exist in Spain about men’s superior social status 
relative to women. To the extent that civil service evaluators are aware 
that gender beliefs exist in the culture, they will subconsciously draw 
from to them to orient their attitudes and behavior even if they do not 
personally endorse their content. The figures above also suggest that, on 
average, Spanish respondents are somewhat more traditional with regards 
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to gender-role attitudes than European and American respondents. Thus, 
there are reasons to believe that gender operates as a status characteristic 
in Spain, with men being seen as higher status than women. At the same 
time, if civil service evaluators hold views that are, on average, 
comparable to the rest of the Spanish population, the implication could be 
that the setting only permits a conservative evaluation of the theory. In 
other words, the study’s findings may be more extreme in Spain than in 
other countries simply by virtue of the greater traditionalism.  
But the literature suggests that the more public scrutiny to which an 
evaluator is subjected, the more likely hiring is to be egalitarian with 
respect to ascribed characteristics. Prior research demonstrates that 
evaluators are motivated to be more accurate they are held accountable for 
their decisions (Simonson & Nye 1992). Accountability can weaken the 
use of expectations by encouraging more effort in information search and 
less superficial processing of information. Foschi (1996) found this effect 
when experimental subjects felt they would be held accountable for their 
assessments (Foschi 1996, p. 251). In addition, accountability may 
motivate evaluators to present themselves in favorable terms (Klimoski & 
Inks 1990). Taken together, these arguments suggest that civil service 
evaluators are more likely to be attentive to issues of equity and fairness 
due to the greater public scrutiny to which recruiters are held.  The reason 
why these exams are public is precisely to facilitate the kind of popular 
scrutiny that would challenge an erroneous decision. In other words, this 
selection process designed this way precisely to avoid bias and favoritism. 
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The Spanish Public Sector 
The first challenge for researchers interested in the study of  hiring 
practices is to gain access to actual data. Virtually all contexts where job 
applicants are evaluated are restricted to outsiders. This work takes 
advantage of a unique exception, and examines a novel hiring setting 
where access is permitted making it feasible to observe and collect data on 
real evaluations and hiring decisions made in the course of direct 
interaction. In Spain, exams to become a government employee are public 
and consist of a series of testing rounds that usually involve the live 
interaction of evaluators and applicants. The this setting is public is that 
Spanish civil service prides itself on being entirely merit-based; as such, 
the process is completely transparent and open to popular scrutiny – status 
beliefs should therefore not operate here. A second and related important 
pillar of civil service recruitment’s merit-based foundations is that 
applicants are selected by committees, it is never the case that a single 
evaluator is entrusted with the selection of applicants. These 
characteristics guarantee that hiring does not rely on the whims and 
idiosyncrasies of single individuals.  
Although some jobs in the Spanish civil service are predominantly 
filled by women, the best positions in Spain’s public sector are still 
largely occupied by men. Civil service positions fall into four major 
categories, namely groups A, B, C, and D7. Group A jobs are the best 
                                                
7 Some examples of group A jobs and their ISCO equivalent are: Abogados del Estado 
(1110 Legislators), Diplomáticos (1120 Diplomatic Representative), Ingenieros 
Navales (2145 Naval Engineer), and Médicos Titulares (2221 Medical Doctors). 
Group B jobs are, for instance, Diplomados en Estadística del Estado (3434 Statistical 
and Mathematical Professionals), and Ingenieros Técnicos Aeronáuticos (3115 
Engineering/Aeronautics Technicians). As for group C: Técnicos Auxiliares de 
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paying and most prestigious, while positions in groups C and D require 
fewer years of education but also pay less well.  
 
Table 2 Percentage of Women in Group A 
Civil Service in Spain by Year 
 
Year % Women 
1996 29.5 
1997 29.7 
1998 30.4 
1999 30.9 
2000 31.9 
2001 32.4 
2002 33.4 
2003 34.1 
                                     Source: Mujeres en Cifras 2003 
As Table 2 shows, in 2003 women filled about 34% of group A 
jobs. Even though these figures may appear optimistic and the general 
pattern shows an increase of women since 1996, it is important to note 
that female applicants make up between 60% and 70% of the initial pool 
in many group A competitions, and around 50% in others8 (See Table 3). 
If we assume that skill is distributed similarly among applicants, and 
                                                                                                                                       
Informática (3121 Computer Assistants), and Técnicos Especialistas en Reproducción 
Cartográfica (3118 Draughtsperson, Cartographical). Finally an example of group D 
jobs is General Auxiliar de la Administración del Estado (4212 Tellers and other 
Counter Clerks). 
8 Some exceptions are Diplomats and Legislators where women make up about 40% 
of the initial applicant pool.  
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evaluations are objective, the number of women that should have been 
recruited should almost double those in Table 2. 
Further inequalities can be detected if Group A aggregate numbers 
are broken down by pay level. There are four levels within group A – 
higher levels (e.g. level 29) correspond to greater salaries. As Table 4 
shows the higher the salary or pay level the smaller the proportion of 
women. 
 
Table 3 Percentage of Women in Initial Applicant Pool  
in Various Group A Competitions 
 
 % Female 
  
Abogado del Estado (Legislator) 42% 
Cuerpo Diplomático (Diplomats) 41% 
Inspector de Hacienda   47% 
Inspector Fiscal 69% 
Juez/Notario (Judge/Notary) 51% 
Registrador 51% 
Secretario Judicial 72% 
Administradores Civiles  64% 
  
              Source: Bagüés 20059 
 
 
Table 5 illustrates that there have been a small but constant upward 
increase in the proportion of women in all pay levels since 2002.  
However this increase has varied considerably in magnitude. 
 
 
                                                
9 Bagüés, M. 2005. ¿Qué Determina el Éxito en unas Oposiciones? FEDEA Working 
Paper 2005-01. 
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Table 4 Percentage of Women by Pay Level  in 
Group A Civil Service in Spain 2002-2007 
 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
        
29 (High)  22.07 23.33 23.99 25.04 27.58 28.75 
28  29.17 30.24 32.33 34.21 35.34 36.63 
27  34.34 35.88 35.96 36.80 37.06 38.59 
26 (Low)  41.68 42.46 43.30 44.33 45.74 46.63 
Source: Instituto de la Mujer. Data: Boletín Estadístico del Personal al Servicio de 
Administraciones Públicas - Registro Central de Personal.  
Available at: http://www.mtas.es/MUJER/mujeres/cifras/ 
 
 
Table 5 Annual Increase of Women in Group A  
Relative to Previous Year by Pay Level (2002-2007) 
 
Year Interval Level 29 Level 28 Level 27 Level 26 
2002-2003 1.26 1.07 1.54 0.78 
2003-2004 0.66 2.09 0.08 0.84 
2004-2005 1.05 1.88 0.84 1.03 
2005-2006 2.54 1.13 0.26 1.41 
2006-2007 1.17 1.29 1.53 0.89 
 
Figure 1 below shows that increases in all pay levels fluctuate 
considerably from one year to the next. For example, the Level 28 line 
shows a 1% increase and a 2% increase in the proportion of women from 
2002 to 2003 and 2003 to 2004 respectively. However, after 2004 
increments slow down considerably.  
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       Figure 1 Percentage Increase of Women by Pay Level & Year 
 
In the discussion above, three ideas are important and should be 
highlighted. First, women are underrepresented in the best positions of the 
Spanish public sector. Second, change is happening but at rather slow and 
fluctuating rates. Third, women are highly interested in attaining these 
positions thus, the system may not be opening up at the speed that women 
might deserve. 
In Spain the public sector means above anything else employment 
stability and exceptional work conditions. According to a report by 
ANECA10 about 45% of university students in Spain report they intend 
pursue a career in government upon graduation. While it is natural for 
both men and women to pursue the best paying and highest status jobs, 
the Spanish labor market has a number of characteristics that make civil 
                                                
10 ANECA or “Agencia Nacional de Evaluación de la Calidad y Acreditación” is a 
Spanish agency created in 2002 to design/implement quality controls in higher 
education systems in Spain.  
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service jobs particularly attractive for women. The next few paragraphs 
will explain why.   
 
Table 6 Percentage of Part-Time Jobholders in Spain 
 
 2005 2006 2007 
    
Female 24.2% 23.2% 22.8% 
Male 4.5% 4.3% 4.1% 
Source: European Economic Statistics 200811 
 
Spain has the fourth highest female unemployment rates of the EU-
27 (10.9% for females, 6.4% for males); only in Croatia, Slovakia, and 
Greece are female unemployment rates higher than in Spain. The 
unemployment gap between men and women in Spain (i.e. 4.5%) is the 
second highest in the EU-27 (Greece is first with 7.6%). To put these 
figures in perspective, the average unemployment rate in the EU-2712 is 
7.8% for women and 6.6%, and in the US 4.5% and 4.7% for women and 
men respectively.  
Second, women in Spain are considerably more likely than men to 
hold part-time contracts (see Table 6). This fact reflects that women face 
family obligations and are compelled to reduce their work hours even if 
that means lower earnings.  
                                                
11 The document can be downloaded at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pageid=1073,46587259&_dad=portal&_
schema=PORTAL&p_product_code=KI-30-08-410  
12http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pageid=1996,45323734&_dad=portal
&_schema=PORTAL&screen=welcomeref&open=/&product=STRIND_EMPLOI&d
epth=2  
40 
In terms of salary, Table 7 shows there are important differences 
between women and men’s earnings across all professional/educational 
categories.  
 
Table 7 Average Income of Men and Women Across 
Occupational/Educational Categories (2005) 
 
 Women Men Women Men Diff. 
 Euro Euro USD USD  
Management  41138 63968 64586 100430 56% 
5-Year University Degree 26733 35930 41971 56409 35% 
3-Year University Degree 23059 29843 36202 46854 29% 
Vocational Studies 20837 29377 32714 46122 41% 
Administrative Jobs 14701 20801 23081 32658 42% 
 
Source: Encuesta de Estructura Salarial 2005 (INE). 
http://www.ine.es/jaxi/menu.do?type=pcaxis&path=%2Ft22%2Fp133%2F2004-
2005%2F&file=pcaxis&L=0&divi=&his 
 
As Heilman and colleagues (2006) have argued, even after women 
succeed in attaining high status jobs, they are never free of the biasing 
effects of stereotypes (see Rudman & Glick 2001). As Heilman and 
colleagues put it: “… it is precisely at this point that processes arising 
from the prescriptive aspect of gender stereotypes are set in motion, with 
a different set of negative consequences for working  women” (Heilman 
and Parks-Stamm 2007, p. 58).  
From this description of the features of the Spanish labor market 
several ideas can be gathered. First, it is more difficult for Spanish women 
to be hired. Second, once hired they earn significantly less than their male 
counterparts. Third, making progress in the professional is more difficult 
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for women. My argument is that this labor market picture should 
encourage women to pursue and be successful in the public sector. Entry 
in the civil service is governed by a more explicit structure, it is 
presumably a merit-based process, and once a position has been attained 
workers do not need to fight for improvements as much as in the private 
sector. Salary decisions, vacation time, leave time, and the like are 
formally regulated; male and female civil servants benefit roughly the 
same. Finally, 5-year university graduates can compete for jobs within 
group A which offer an entry level salary of about 57.000 USD (€36.000) 
per year which is above the average income of workers with the same 
level of education (Table 7). In sum, these are good jobs in terms of pay, 
work conditions, and other social benefits. Women want them as much as 
men, if not more. By being employed in the public sector, women solve 
most issues that put them at a disadvantage in private employment. So, 
why is it that female applicants are failing exams that would lead to their 
recruitment?  
 
Civil Service Exams  
One purpose of this project is to offer empirical evidence 
illustrating the concrete or real-world manifestations of mechanisms 
discovered in controlled laboratory settings. There is ample experimental 
evidence confirming that women are evaluated less positively relative to 
men even when they provide the same evidence for competence.  
However, there is very little empirical evidence about what these 
mechanisms look like in the real world. Although experiments are ideal 
for establishing causal relationships, the next step should be to show how 
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these mechanisms operate in natural contexts. My approach was to select 
a natural context that is highly structured (and meets the scope conditions 
of the theory I use) and account for aspects that would be experimentally 
controlled in the laboratory – i.e. performance, qualifications etc. In the 
paragraphs below I will offer a summary description of the context of this 
study and the specific setting I selected. Second, I will discuss the 
advantages and limitations of the setting. 
In Spain, a fixed number of government vacancies are announced 
annually for specific positions by level of qualification required. Access 
to any of these job openings requires passing several rounds of testing that 
typically involve face-to-face exams. After a brief probationary period, 
the highest scoring examinees become permanent government employees. 
Each round of exams lasts several weeks, takes place throughout the year, 
and requires the participation of various evaluating committees. 
Applicants are allocated to examination dates and evaluation committees 
according to a lottery based on a first random draw. 
This study focuses on a specific group, namely Administradores 
Civiles del Estado13. ACE are senior officials with broad administrative 
knowledge and responsibility in areas such as budget, human resources, 
and contracts in the Spanish Administration. ACE official are in charge of 
drafting top-level government proposals, as well handling public policy. 
They hold management-level positions in different government offices 
and European Union agencies. The highest ranking ACE officials work 
closely with politicians and many become prestigious and influential 
politicians themselves (Crespo 2004).  
                                                
13 ISCO equivalent: Senior government official (four digit code 1120) 
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The ACE selection process is highly competitive. Prospective 
applicants prepare for these exams full-time for no less than 2-3 years and 
up to 5 or 6. Nonetheless, hard work does not always pay off; some 
applicants abandon the pursuit entirely after repeated failure. Sometimes 
applicants prepare for these exams by themselves but more often they 
study under the mentoring and supervision of a personal trainer. Trainers 
are ACE officials themselves and their job is to guide and coach 
prospective candidates as they prepare for exams and go through the 
recruitment process. 
The ACE recruitment process was selected based on several 
considerations. First, data from exploratory interviews suggested that 
ACE recruitment is perceived to be unbiased, which is not the case with 
other public recruitment processes in Spain. In-depth interviews were 
conducted with 12 applicants (58% women) in May 2005 and multiple 
informal interviews were carried out between September and December 
2005. Interviewed applicants shared the notion that ACE recruitment is 
merit-based and often compared it to other selection processes which, in 
their minds, are not based entirely on merit. For example, recruitment for 
the Diplomatic Corps is perceived to be highly biased in favor of male 
candidates. Requirements for these positions are framed as incompatible 
with gender assumptions around family and motherhood. As a result 
women are often (1) discouraged from entering the actual competition 
(see Table 3), and/or (2) confronted with awkward questions during the 
actual exams – i.e. women are indirectly asked about their life plans and 
family prospects. Judges construe job demands (e.g. traveling. living 
abroad etc.) as incompatible with assumptions based on stereotyped 
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images of women, their goals, and aspirations (i.e. women want children, 
stability etc.). As Heilman (1983) has argued, stereotypes about women 
create problems because there is a perceived lack of fit between women’s 
presumed capabilities and the requirements for a given job (Heilman 
1983). This is particularly true when women attempt to gain access to 
upper-level jobs, as the qualities believed to be necessary for these jobs 
are usually perceived as male-typed (Lyness 2002).  
By contrast, the ACE selection process is perceived as being more 
gender neutral. Gender status theories do not presume evaluators are 
explicitly sexist or prejudiced; rather, they argue that under certain 
conditions gender implicitly affects the perception of competence in a 
way that usually (but not always) disadvantages women.  
A second advantage of this context is that, although it is not a 
controlled environment in the strictest sense, the setting is sufficiently 
structured with the important advantage of real world consequences. 
Applicants do not generally differ in their ethnicity, nationality, or level of 
education. Since gender is the characteristic of interest here, variation in 
any of the above would complicate the interpretation of results.  
Similarly, all exams take place under uniform conditions (physical 
location, format of the exam, duration etc.). which allows for repeated 
observation of the same event with gender (of applicants and judges) 
being the one aspect that varies. Importantly, evaluators know very little 
about applicants (e.g. name. date of birth etc.) precisely to facilitate 
objectivity - SCT and DST predict that gender will have more of an effect 
when no other status information is present in the setting; thus, evaluators 
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will be more likely to rely on status beliefs and stereotypes to orient their 
attitudes and behavior.  
Fourth, the selection of applicants is not done by an individual 
evaluator but by committees of 5 judges. About 20 judges participate in 
SCA recruitment every year; in addition, judges vary from one year to the 
next. If decisions were made by a single evaluator, it would be hard to 
rule out the possibility that the outcomes observed are simply the 
reflection of one person’s preferences.  
Judges come from different backgrounds of the Spanish 
administration; between 50-60% are ACE officials themselves, and the 
rest are university professors, diplomats, judges etc. Committees are 
generally gender balanced; in terms of age, committees are composed of 
an even number of junior and senior members. These features tie in with 
the very tenets of this selection process, namely impartiality.  
There have been a tremendous effort to make civil service 
recruitment merit-based. The demographic composition of committees is 
important because traditionally evaluating boards were largely male. In 
the last ten years, major efforts have been made to make committees more 
diverse and balanced specifically with regards to gender. The general idea 
underlying this move is that more balanced boards will arrive at more 
unbiased recruitment decisions.  
 Finally, this study examines processes at various rounds of testing; 
the range of ability among applicants is muted after round one since the 
lowest performing applicants have presumably been eliminated from the 
competition. In sum, although the setting I selected has the limitations 
described, it is not very far distant from the kinds of conditions one would 
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want to recreate in a controlled laboratory experiment, with the important 
advantage of having real world consequences.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
PART I: HYPOTHESES & METHODS 
 
As outlined in the introductory chapter, this project has two distinct 
analytical sections. This chapter and the next will discuss hypotheses and 
methods (Chapter 5) and results (Chapter 6) for part one. In the following 
paragraphs I will offer a detailed description of the ACE recruitment 
process. Interview and observational data were crucial to gain an in-depth 
understanding of the hiring procedures governing ACE exams and 
formulate some of the study’s hypotheses.  
In this competition applicants go through a total of four qualifying 
exams that take place throughout the year in Madrid – i.e. May, June, 
September, and November. All exam sessions are public; observers are 
asked to leave the exam premises when judges deliberate and assign a 
score, which is made public shortly after – i.e. test results are posted on a 
bulletin board outside the exam room. Examining boards are composed of 
5 judges whose votes are independent and have equal value regardless of 
their rank or seniority.  
Exams 1, 2, and 4 are written exams although the exercises are not 
read by individual judges. Rather, applicants themselves read their exams 
out loud in front of a board of judges (henceforth “reading session”) on a 
specific day and time assigned to them at random. Exam 3 is purely oral; 
applicants are given one hour to verbally rehearse four questions drawn at 
random from an official study guide composed of over one hundred 
topics. Judges have 15 minutes to ask applicants exam-related questions –
this part of Exam 3 will be referred to as Q&A portion or simply Q&A.  
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In exam 1 applicants have 4 hours to write a general knowledge 
essay that they later read to the evaluating committee. Although essay 
questions are broad, applicants are specifically required to relate their 
answers to the appropriate topics of the official study guide. Exam 2 is a 
foreign language test where candidates are evaluated on their translation 
and listening comprehension skills. In exam 4 applicants are given four 
hours to discuss in writing the solution to several applied questions. 
Applicants may consult their books and materials when writing exam 4. 
Exams 1, 2, and 4 are similar that they involve a written part and a 20-30 
minute public reading session, which is usually scheduled days or weeks 
after the written part of the exams. In exams 2 and 4, judges have 15 
minutes to engage in a dialogue with applicants and ask them exam-
related questions - exam 1 does not include a Q&A portion. Finally, exam 
3 is purely oral; applicants are given one hour to answer 4 questions 
drawn at random from topics in the study guide. Candidates have 20 
minutes to write out the outline that later guides their one-hour 
uninterrupted performance. Evaluators have 15 minutes to ask exam-
related questions at the end.  
Although this is what official procedures establish, the actual 
exams either (a) differed from the official version and/or (b) are 
characterized by additional features identifiable only by direct 
observation. I conducted direct observation of exam sessions in May 2005 
and from September to December 2005. Two main ideas were gathered 
from this fieldwork. First, one might think that since exam 3 is purely oral 
this feature sets it apart from all others. Direct observation made it clear 
that this was hardly the case. Due to the highly memory-oriented nature of 
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exam 3 and the strict time constraints (i.e. applicants must devote exactly 
15 minutes to each of the four questions), applicants’ presentations end up 
being highly scripted, fast-paced, and matter-of-fact; applicants’ verbal 
style is not much more natural than it is in the reading sessions of exams 
1, 2, and 4. Second, direct observation permitted observing that the most 
important differences between exams are (a) the presence/absence of a 
Q&A portion and (b) the nature of the questions asked in the Q&A. These 
differences and their implications will be discussed thoroughly next. 
About 70% of applicants were not asked any questions at the end of 
exam 4. As for the remaining 30%, the Q&A rarely lasted more than 5 
minutes on average (SD = 2.7 minutes) and seldom involved the 
participation of more than one judge. In January 2006 I interviewed a 
female judge and a male judge who participated in the 2005 ACE 
recruitment process. In-depth interviews lasted about 90 minutes and 
consisted of a series of open-ended questions about the recruitment 
process. My interviews included questions such as evaluators’ perception 
of exams (i.e. which exams seem more/less difficult to evaluate and why). 
how decisions are made when judges deliberate, and about the 
inconsistencies between official exam procedures and those that were 
actually followed. Both judges I interviewed confirmed that evaluators 
tacitly agree not to ask questions at the end of exam 4; apparently the 
purpose of questions is to measure applicants’ spontaneity. Applicants 
typically consult what they wrote at exam 4 with their personal trainers 
and prepare in advance for potential questions that may come up during 
the reading session. Thus, questions asked at exam 4 do not necessarily 
measure applicants’ problem-solving abilities, but rather the extent to 
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which applicants prepared in advance for potential questions. Interview 
data clearly suggests that the Q&A portion is viewed as an opportunity for 
judges to gauge applicants’ unplanned reactions to questions. When the 
ability to measure this is undermined, questions are no longer important 
and thereby avoided by judges.  
All applicants were asked questions in exam 2. Since exam 2 is a 
foreign language exam,  questions were intended to provide opportunities 
for applicants to express themselves in a language other than Spanish. 
Questions in exam 2 were drawn from a list that evaluators had previously 
thought out; thus, questions repeated frequently and were somewhat 
scripted (i.e. “what is your favorite pet?”). These questions were generally 
posed by one of the evaluators, a language expert, brought specifically for 
assisting the committee in exam 2.  
Finally, the Q&A portion of exam 3 was systematically used, 
involved all or most judges, and lasted an average of 12.7 minutes per 
applicant. The Q&A part of exam 3 was the one and only section of the 
entire selection process that involved an actual dialogue between judges 
and applicants.  
 
Gender Typing of Exams & Degree of Interaction 
Recall that status characteristics theory predicts that when gender is 
salient in task oriented settings, men will be evaluated more positively 
than women so long as the skills being assessed are perceived to be 
masculine or neutral. There are reasons to believe that in Spain, women 
are typically thought to be better at verbal skills in general and foreign 
languages in particular. For example, about 75% of university students 
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majoring in English, French, Spanish, and Italian philology are women. 
Similarly, more than 80% of college students majoring in translation and 
interpretation are women. While it may seem that these figures simply 
show that Spanish women have a strong preference for these disciplines; 
it also suggests that generalized beliefs exist in Spain regarding women’s 
superior ability in foreign languages. Following Correll (2001) I assume 
that individuals need to feel competent about something in order to pursue 
it: “…while many factors certainly influence individual career relevant 
decisions and preferences, as a minimum, one must feel competent at the 
skills or tasks necessary for a given career in order to commit oneself to 
pursuing that career.” (Correll 2001, p. 1700). In other words, women 
chose these college majors, at least partially, because they believe they are 
good at foreign languages. Correll (2001) demonstrated that self-
assessments or “personal conceptions of task competence” (Correll 2001) 
are shaped by broadly shared beliefs that exist in the culture and affect 
individuals’ self evaluations, which in turn shape future career 
orientations. The key point is that women’s choices reflect more than their 
preferences; these choices suggest that in Spain individuals share the idea 
that women are better than men at foreign languages. The prediction then 
is that female applicants will not disadvantaged at all exams: 
 
Hypothesis 1: the group advantaged at each exam will vary as a 
function of the gender typing of the task to be evaluated.  
 
Hypothesis 1a: male applicants will score significantly higher than 
female applicants when the skills evaluated are perceived as masculine or 
neutral (i.e. exams 1, 3, & 4). 
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Hypothesis 1b: female applicants will score somewhat higher than 
male applicants when the skills evaluated are perceived as feminine (i.e. 
exam 2).  
 
Recall from chapter 3 that the shifting standards model would 
predict in my civil service context, that female applicants will be judged 
according to more lenient standards the first round of testing but not in 
others. Although exam 1 serves as a screening or filter, this does not 
necessarily imply that this exam it is less important or less demanding 
than the others. In fact, exam 1 ranks second in importance after exam 3. 
These exams are not incremental in difficulty, rather, each round of 
testing evaluates different abilities, all of which are required to succeed at 
the job. In fact, exam 1 sets the ACE selection process apart from other 
civil service recruitment processes. Typically exams are extremely 
memory oriented. The ACE corps prides itself on being different and 
thereby needs a different type of applicant. Exam 1 is there to ensure that 
applicants cannot only memorize but can also write well and connect 
ideas in coherent and compelling ways. Although it comes first, Exam 1 is 
not the equivalent of the preliminary interview in other hiring contexts. 
Thus, my prediction is that female applicants will be evaluated according 
to a stricter standard this round of testing as well.  
 As I argued in the last section of Chapter 3, a setting needs not 
involve direct interaction for SCT and DST predictions to apply. Based on 
Ridgeway’s work (1997) on interaction and Heilman’s (2001) ambiguity 
thesis, I propose that contexts involving less structured interactions 
encourage actors to enact their gendered beliefs to a greater extent than 
settings were interaction is more rigid or minimal. Thus, while gender 
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status theory predictions will work regardless of the level of structure in 
judge-applicant interactions, the magnitude of gender differences in the 
outcome of interest (i.e. exam score) will be greater when actors interact 
more naturally and freely than when relate to one another  in more 
scripted ways. In less structured interactions, allowed and prohibited 
behaviors are not clearly defined. Thus, it is up to the individual to fill this 
gap or absence of rules, and actors will exercise such freedom in a gender 
biased manner. Thus, if evaluators have implicit preferences for male 
applicants, a less structured setting will enable them to behave in ways 
consistent with these beliefs more so than settings were interaction is 
more guided or structured. 
Recall the thorough description of exams provided earlier in this 
chapter.  Table 8 below summarizes some of the key ideas that need to be 
kept in mind to understand the motivation of subsequent empirical 
predictions.  
 
Table 8 Degree of Interaction Characterizing  
Each Section of all Four Testing Rounds 
 
  Exam D.I.S. Q&A D.I.S. Total 
            
Round 1 Read + NO - + 
Round 2 Read + YES + ++ 
Round 3 Oral + YES ++ +++ 
Round 4 Read + NO - + 
 
Note: D.I.S. = Degree of Interaction Score 
In assigning each testing round a degree of structure of interaction 
score I have considered (a) characteristics of the actual exam (i.e. “Exam” 
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column in Table 8) and (b) features of the Q&A part (i.e. “Q&A” column 
in Table 8).  Even though exams 1, 2, and 4 are read and exam 3 is oral, 
they all receive only one plus sign because, as argued earlier, applicants’ 
speech style is similarly scripted across all four exams. Only exams 2 and 
3 have a Q&A portion at the end. The Q&A of exam 2 is more artificial 
than that of exam 3; thus, exam 3 receives two plus signs. According to 
this classification, exam 3 is the most interactive, followed by exam 2, 
and exams 1 and 4. The essential point is that exam 3 is different from all 
others because applicants and judges engage in a fairly natural 
conversation, which is not the case in any other exam.   
It has been argued that the degree of structure in applicant-judge 
interactions will impact the magnitude of H1a and H1b predictions. If so: 
 
Hypothesis 2: the magnitude of gender differences in passing rates 
will be affected by the degree of structure characterizing a given exam.  
 
Hypothesis 2a: small differences will be detected between male and 
female’s passing rates in exams characterized by minimal applicant-
evaluator interaction (i.e. exams 1 and 4).  
 
Hypothesis 2b: larger differences will be detected between male 
and female’s passing rates in exams involving a greater degree of 
applicant-evaluator interaction (i.e. exams 2 and 3). 
 
Table 9 summarizes the above classification as well as all empirical 
predictions. According to status characteristics theory female applicants 
will be disadvantaged in all but exam 2 (i.e. exam 2 evaluates female-
typed skills). By introducing the concept of degree of structure in 
interaction, I make a more nuanced prediction; namely, that the magnitude 
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of SCT predictions will vary as a function of structural features of the 
setting; small gender differences will be observed in exams 1 and 4 and 
larger gender differences in passing rates will be observed in exam 3.   
 
Table 9 Exam Classification and Empirical Predictions 
 
Exam Exam Characteristics Predictions 
 
Gender 
Typing of 
Task 
Degree of 
Interaction 
Advantaged 
Group 
Magnitude 
of 
Advantage 
1 Neutral + Men Small 
2 Feminine ++ Women Moderate 
3 Neutral +++ Men Large 
4 Neutral + Men Small 
  
 
Data & Methods 
 I gathered and examined data for 1476 ACE applicants (514 men 
and 955 women) who participated in ACE competitions between 2003 
and 2005. Since 2003 the results of major civil service competitions are 
posted in PDF documents at official government websites. These data 
could be gathered and prepared for statistical analysis through an 
automated program. Publicly available information includes the 
applicants' names, their personal identification numbers14, and their exam 
results at each testing round. In addition, these records contain the date 
and order in which candidates take exams.  
                                                
14 The Spanish equivalent of the Social Security Number, a unique identifier issued by 
the government to each Spanish citizen.  
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 From this publicly available information I created a set of variables 
indicating identity (name, SSN), gender, exam scores, and the order in 
which applicants are tested. Applicants who fail an exam do not receive a 
numeric score; these applicants’ measures were coded as missing. Finally, 
there are variables relating to the relative order in which applicants go 
through testing rounds (order is always assigned based on a first random 
draw), which have no theoretical importance and will therefore be 
excluded from the analysis.  
The resulting data file consisted of multilevel data with three levels: 
candidate, exam, and year. To evaluate the hypotheses above, I used 
logistic regression clustered by applicant ID to control for the fact some 
candidates reenter the competition after having failed in previous years 
and, as such, observations are not independent.  
A shortcoming of these data is that the available demographic 
information on applicants and judges is limited.  Importantly this setting 
is highly controlled; there is little variation among applicants in terms of 
age, education, ethnicity, and other status information. In order to 
compete for these positions applicants must have a Bachelor in Arts or 
Bachelor in Science degree – the majority of applicants (about 75%) have 
a degree in Law, which is  an undergraduate major in Spain. Thus, the 
initial pool of applicants is fairly homogeneous except for the  gender 
characteristic of interest.  
In the next chapter I will evaluate if SCT can account for the 
outcomes observed in this natural context. I have argued that women will 
be disadvantaged (i.e. score lower than their male competitors) in exams 
assessing male/neutral skills. In addition, I have proposed that the degree 
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of structure in applicant-judge interactions will impact the size of this 
disadvantage. In the next chapter I evaluate these hypotheses and discuss 
their implications.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
PART I: RESULTS & DISCUSSION  
 
 Throughout this project I have argued that Spanish women are 
interested in attaining high status government jobs (i.e. 64% of the initial 
applicant pool are women) but that they fail exams that would lead to 
their recruitment at greater rates than their male competitors. There are 
various basic explanations for this outcome. Either female applicants are 
less skilled than male applicants, evaluations are biased in favor of males, 
or a combination of both.  
 Although it cannot be ruled out yet that female applicants might be 
under-qualified, this work examines processes at various rounds of 
testing; thus, it can be argued that the range of ability among applicants is 
muted after round one since the lowest performing applicants have 
presumably been eliminated from the competition. In addition, the current 
literature supports that evaluations are often biased in favor of men, 
except when the setting is female-typed.  
In this section I will evaluate the adequacy of status characteristics 
theory to explain how male and female applicants perform in all four 
rounds of testing. I will also use what I call degree of structure in 
applicant-judge interactions to understand variations in the size of SCT 
predictions.  
The following paragraphs will examine the following questions: (i) 
in what exams are female applicants disadvantaged, and (ii) what is the 
magnitude of such disadvantage.  
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Hypothesis 1: Sex-Typing of Exams 
Recall from chapter five that hypothesis 1 is concerned with how 
female applicants fare at rounds of testing involving the evaluation of 
male/neutral and female-typed skills. SCT does not predict that women 
will always be evaluated less positively relative to men. Rather, SCT 
argues that men will be perceived as diffusely more competent than 
equally qualified women so long as the task evaluated is not one where 
women are stereotypically thought to excel (e.g. foreign languages). As 
argued in chapter five, the high presence of women in foreign language 
majors at Spanish universities suggests that generalized beliefs exist in 
Spain that associate women with excellence in foreign languages. Exam 2 
of the ACE selection process involves assessing English and French 
skills. Thus, the prediction is that female applicants will not be 
disadvantaged in this particular exam. The rationale would be that  
evaluators are aware of broadly shared beliefs regarding women’s 
superiority in foreign languages. Thus, judges will unconsciously expect 
female applicants to do better than males in exam 2 – i.e. judges’ 
performance expectations for women will be high in the context of exam 
2. Thus the prediction is that male applicants will pass at greater rates than 
female applicants across all exams except exam 2. The following model 
will permit evaluating such hypothesis: 
 
y = a + b x1 + c x2 + d x1 x2 + e 
 
where y is the dependent variable pass, x1 is applicant’s sex (1=female), x2 
is exam 2. I predict that the main effect of sex (female=1) on the log odds 
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of passing an exam will not be significant but that the interaction effect of 
sex and exam 2 will positively impact the log odds of passing (see Model 
1 in Table 10). 
 
 Table 10 Coefficients from a Logit Regression of the Log Odds of 
Passing an Exam on Gender, Exam 2, & Gender*Exam 2 
 
 Model 1 
Female -0.303 
 1.71 
Exam 2 0.690 
 (2.68)* 
Exam2*Fema
le 
1.029 
 (3.07)* 
Constant 0.016 
 0.11 
Observations 1372 
  
                       Note: N = 1372. Observations are clustered by ID  
                          (N=424). Absolute values of Z statistics in parentheses.  
 
The results in Table 10 (Model 1) suggest that female applicants 
have a higher probability of passing exam 2 but not others - although the 
negative main effect of gender on the log odds of passing an exam is not 
significant at conventional statistical levels. The interaction term shows 
that female applicants are about twice as likely to pass exam 2 than male 
applicants (1/exp[1.029-0.303]). As for exams 1, 3, and 4, female 
candidates are about 1.35 less likely to pass than their male competitors 
(1/exp[-0.303]). These results confirm that women do better than men at 
exams where female-typed skills are assessed, and somewhat worse than 
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male applicants when the abilities evaluated are masculine or neutral.  
But, are female applicants equally disadvantaged at exams 1, 3, and 4? 
Answering this question is the task I next turn to. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Degree of Structure of Interactions 
I have argued in previous chapters that the degree of structure of 
judge-applicant interactions varies across exams. If exams were ordered 
from greater degree of structure to lowest: exam 1, exam 4, exam 2, and 
exam 3. SCT predicts that women will score lower at exams 1, 3, and 4 
because male/neutral-type abilities are assessed. I now turn to the question 
of whether or not women are equally disadvantaged across these three 
exams. If degree of structure in applicant-judge interactions matters,  it 
should be possible to explore whether the negative impact of female on 
pass varies in magnitude across exams 1, 3, and 4. Based on my argument 
that less structured interactions will benefit high status groups and vice-
versa, I predicted that the magnitude of female applicants’ disadvantage 
will be greater in exam 3 than in exams 1 and 4.  
Recall that exam 2 evaluates female-typed abilities, thus no gender 
penalty is expected for women in exam 2; rather, women will enjoy an 
advantage relative to men in this exam. Although I have argued that exam 
2 is more interactive than 1 and 4,  no predictions can be made as to the 
degree condition will impact the female advantage – i.e. this is the only 
exam where stereotypically female abilities are evaluated.  
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Table 11 Coefficients from a Logit Regression of the Log Odds 
of Passing an Exam on Gender, Exam, and Year 
  Model 2 Model 3 
Female  0.675 0.678 
  (2.27)** (2.21)** 
Exam 1 -0.999 -0.868 
  (3.82)* (2.55)** 
Exam 3 -0.412 -0.634 
  (1.20) (1.50) 
Exam 4 0.519 0.672 
  (1.13) (1.10) 
Exam1*Female -0.729 -0.721 
  (2.18)** (2.11)** 
Exam3*Female -1.629 -1.693 
  (3.87)* (3.94)* 
Exam4*Female -0.959 -0.960 
  (1.66)+ (1.63)+ 
Year 2003   -0.198 
    (0.51) 
Year 2005   0.251 
    (0.74) 
2003*Exam1   -0.064 
    (0.15) 
2003*Exam3   0.149 
    (0.28) 
2004*Exam4   -0.045 
    (0.06) 
2005*Exam1   -0.208 
    (0.54) 
2005*Exam3   0.453 
    (0.97) 
2005*Exam4   -0.454 
    (0.68) 
Constant 0.852 0.755 
  (3.69)* (2.53)** 
         Note: N = 1372. Observations are clustered by ID (N=424). 
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To evaluate this hypothesis I estimated the following model: 
 
y = a + b x1 + c x2 + d x3 + e x4 + f x1 x2 + g x1 x3 + h x1 x4 + e 
 
where x1 denotes applicants’ sex (1=female) and x2  x3  x4  are exams 
1, 2, and 4 respectively. Because I argue that the negative effect of female 
is not invariant across exams the model also includes the interaction of  
sex and the exam dummies.  As Table 11 (Model 2) shows, there is a 
positive main effect of sex on the log odds of passing. However, this main 
effect is adjusted downward for all exams except the baseline exam 2 by 
the value of the exam and gender interaction coefficients. Model 3 in 
Table 11 controls for year’s effects and the interaction effect of years and 
exams. The interaction terms of gender and exam in Model 3 show that 
women and men have roughly equal log odds of passing exam 1 (1/[exp(-
.72+.68)]), women are more likely than men to pass exam 2 ([exp(.68)]), 
and men are more likely than women to pass exams 3 and 4. The strongest 
gender effect is in exam 3, which men are roughly 2.76 times more likely 
to pass than women (1/[exp(-1.69+.68)]). As for exam 4, men are about 
1.33 times more likely to pass than their female counterparts (1/[exp(-
.96+.68)]).  
Although statistically significant, differences between male and 
female applicants passing rates at exams 1 and 4 are small. In the case of 
exam 1 the difference is not substantively significant. Female applicants 
enjoy a considerable advantage in exam 2 which involves the assessment 
of female-typed abilities. The gender coefficient on the log odds of 
passing exam 2 indicates that women are just under twice as likely to pass 
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exam 2 as men. This is a bit inconsistent with what SCT would predict 
which is that women would do somewhat better (but not far better) than 
men in exam 2.  
These results could raise the concern that since a high number of 
female applicants pass exam 2, selection effects may boost the magnitude 
of the negative effect of gender in exam 3. In other words, it could be the 
case that female applicants who are not sufficiently competent make it to 
round three due to the higher performance expectations evaluators hold 
them to in round two. This would be a fair concern if exam 2 was the first 
round of testing. However, note that applicants have already pass through 
a first filter, exam 1. Presumably the lowest performing candidates are 
eliminated at the first round. Exam 1 is highly demanding and requires 
that applicants have carefully studied the official study guide topics. 
Recall that exam 1 consists of writing an essay about a substantive topic 
and, importantly, connecting that topic to the appropriate subjects of the 
study guide. Thus my argument is that exam 1 is an effective first filter in 
this selection process. In addition, judges are highly compelled to be strict 
and demand high standards from applicants in exam 1. The duration of the 
selection process depends largely on the decisions made by evaluators in 
exam 1. Understandably, judges are rationally oriented to making the 
selection process as short and efficient as possible. Thus, they are 
motivated to select only those applicants that are perceived to have a real 
shot at winning the competition. This is true to all rounds but specifically 
so to round one where the applicant pool is larger.  
In sum, the results above confirm that (1) as being female does not 
always impact pass outcomes negatively; rather, the advantaged or 
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disadvantaged group will vary as a function of the gender typing of the 
abilities evaluated like SCT predicts, and (2) classifying exams by the 
degree of structure of applicant-judge interactions is useful to explain 
variation in the magnitude of SCT predictions.  
In the next chapters I will examine the processes at play in exam 3. 
I have argued that female applicants do much worse in this exam than in 
any other because applicants and judges interact more freely or to a 
greater extent in this round of testing.  Next I will elaborate on this idea 
by providing a detailed account of the processes and behaviors at play in 
the Q&A part of exam 3. I have argued that it is the characteristics of this 
Q&A portion that makes exam 3 different from all others. I identified and 
quantified a behaviors that only occurred in the third round of testing 
making exam 3 Q&A less structured. This is negative for women because 
evaluators will have more freedom to act on their gendered attitudes and 
exhibit subtle discriminatory behaviors.  In chapter seven I will specify a 
set of hypotheses that will help us understand how judges’ behaviors 
reflect biases against and disadvantage female applicants.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
PART II: HYPOTHESES & METHODS 
 
This section focuses on the processes at play in the Q&A portion of 
exam 3 where judges take turns asking questions to each applicant for 
about 15 minutes. I have proposed that since interactions are less 
structured in this part of exam 3, judges will be more likely (in the 
absence of explicit rules) to use their own gender biased criteria to orient 
their attitudes and behavior. Biases in evaluations are typically studied in 
experimental settings where performance is experimentally controlled and 
gender is experimentally manipulated. Thus, observed differences in 
outcomes (e.g. being recommended, hired, or promoted) reveals 
differences in assessments due to factors outside objective skill, 
competence, or qualifications – in this case, the factor would be gender. 
In natural settings perceptions of performances are revealed and 
become known much more subtly. For example, an employee reporting to 
his boss may not receive an explicit assessment of his/her input. 
Nonetheless, the boss will certainly form an impression of the employee’s 
contribution in the course of their encounter. How does one gather the 
boss’ assessment?  First, an estimate could be obtained by self-report – 
i.e. asking the boss directly. Another option would be to focus on the 
content and style of the employer-employee interaction - i.e. verbal and 
non-verbal cues. The former is problematic and unreliable because 
implicit opinions might not be apparent to the actor. Also, social 
desirability issues pressure individuals to provide socially acceptable 
responses even if their true opinions differ.  
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If one were to instead focus on verbal and non-verbal cues, one 
could measure behaviors such as looking at/away from the speaker,  
fidgeting, nodding, cooperative and non-cooperative utterances and so 
forth. For instance, if the listener looks away while his/her partner is 
speaking it might indicate lack of interest. This in turn, could frustrate the 
speaker who may then become distracted and loose track of what’s in 
his/her mind.  
As the example above suggests, in natural contexts individuals are 
not usually confronted with immediate and tangible assessments, but 
rather with behaviors revealing positive or negative evaluations from 
others. Expectation states theory argues that inequalities in task oriented 
groups are due to the differential performance expectations members hold 
for themselves and one another. When group members hold high 
expectations for an actor they behave as though the actor’s performance is 
likely to be useful to the group. Low expectations reflect the reverse. A 
performance expectation is a theoretical construct that is not directly 
observable. For these reasons, in this work I focused and measured 
behaviors that presumably reveal (i) the judges’ performance expectations 
for applicants and (ii) the applicants’ performance style. In other words, 
the interest is on behaviors that give away or signal something about 
evaluators’ thought processes as they assess applicants, as well as 
applicants’ displays of confidence or lack of confidence. Although my 
coding criteria will be thoroughly explained in the data and methods 
sections, I will offer a succinct review of some of the existing research on 
gender and non-verbal behavior and will then specify concrete empirical 
predictions.  
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Who Interrupts Whom?  
Participants in conversations are expected to adhere to the turn 
taking system; fairness in conversations entails that only one speaker talk 
at a time (Marche & Peterson 1993). Interruptions are violations of the 
unwritten conversational contract and have been defined as instances of 
simultaneous speech that involve an intrusion into the structure of a 
speaker’s utterance (West & Zimmerman 1983). Interruptions display 
rudeness and a lack of respect for the speaker. they restrict the rights of 
speakers as well as allow interrupters to control the topic of conversation 
and exert control and dominance over their conversational partner 
(Marche & Peterson 1993). By interrupting one’s partner, one is in effect 
saying that the partners presence or input is not equal to one’s own and 
hence can be overlooked. Interruptions have been interpreted as a subtle 
reminder of the others lesser worth (Smith-Lovin & Brody 1989; 
LaFrance 1992).  
Although the language literature is quite consistent in considering 
interruptions as negative sanctions. I argue that this specific setting calls 
for even stricter conversational rules insofar as a subset of the participants 
are being evaluated and thus are in a vulnerable position. These interviews 
should be opportunities for applicants to showcase their knowledge and 
skills. Interruptions interfere with this goal by limiting applicants’ floor 
time, and putting applicants’ confidence at ease thereby crippling their 
ability to express ideas effectively. Interruptions presumably occur when 
judges believe applicants are not doing so well; thus, measuring 
interruptions should give us an accurate read of how judges assess an on-
going performance.  
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I have argued that in less structured interactions (i.e. exam 3 Q&A) 
judges and applicants will be more likely to enact behaviors reflecting 
preconceived beliefs about gender. But recall from the theory section that 
SCT and DST make specific predictions about how men and women 
behave in this setting. Generally, SCT and DST predict that evaluators 
will assume that male applicants will produce more valuable contributions 
than female applicants. Then, SCT and DST predict, women will receive 
fewer opportunities to participate, will be treated with less deference, and 
stricter standards will be used to evaluate their performance.  
In this context, these general predictions can be assessed by 
focusing on judges’ interrupting behavior, which I argued displays 
disregard for the speaker and limits a speaker’s opportunities to make 
contributions.  
Having lived in both the United States and Spain, it seems clearly 
that interrupting is less counter normative in the latter. While it is true that 
conversational rules are culture specific and that in Spain interrupting one 
and other in informal conversations may be more socially acceptable, this 
setting is highly formal and as such strict conversational rules should also 
apply. In other words, setting specific rules should prevail over culture-
specific norms; interrupting in this context is likely a norm violation. In 
fact, applicants are not interrupted most of the time (i.e. 73% n=938). In 
addition, while it might be the case that Spaniards are more prone to 
interrupting relative to individuals from other nations, the central point is 
whether male and female applicants receive differential interruptions. In 
other words, even if on average Spanish judges interrupt more frequently 
than hypothetical non-Spanish evaluators (i.e. mean levels may vary 
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across cultures), it is gender differences that matter here (i.e. the gender 
gap in interruptions could be similar across cultures). Finally, direct 
observation permitted detecting signs of stress in applicants when they 
were interrupted repeatedly. These responses were not measured 
systematically but included sighs, nervous laugher and the like, which 
confirms that applicants take interruptions negatively and not as the 
cultural norm.  
 
Hypothesis 3: female applicants will receive more interruptions than male 
applicants. 
 
The literature on gender an interruptions suggests that women are 
less likely to interrupt than men (Eakins & Eakins 1978; Smith-Lovin & 
Brody 1989). The following hypothesis evaluates this claim: 
 
Hypothesis 4: male judges will interrupt applicants more often than 
female judges.  
 
 
When do Interruptions Occur? 
One of the main interests of this work is to identify the 
circumstances under which interruptions occur. By discerning when, the 
why can also be inferred, thus we would be in a position to gather judges 
cognitive processes or performance expectations which, as argued, are not 
directly observable. Interruptions presumably occur, at least partially, in 
response to applicants’ behaviors that reveal the quality or style of their 
performances. In particular, I measured (i) applicants’ pauses and (ii) 
applicants’ utterance duration.  
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As argued in the theory chapter, double standards theory suggests 
that similar behavior will be interpreted differently as a function of salient 
status characteristics such as gender. When a behavior is displayed by 
individuals for whom there exist different expectations, its meaning may 
be interpreted very differently. Empirical evidence demonstrates that 
when actors differ in gender, the implications drawn from their behavior 
is quite different (Kunda, Sinclair, & Griffin 1997). For example the same 
demeanor may be characterized as laid-back when exhibited by a man, 
and as timid when exhibited by a woman. Thus, behavioral information is 
quite malleable, with its meaning varying depending upon what is 
expected. The nice feature of pauses and utterance duration is that, unlike 
interrupting behavior, both measures are susceptible to be interpreted in 
positive or negative ways. Applicants may pause because they don’t know 
the answer to a question, because they are nervous, because they are 
thoughtful and so forth. It is up to the evaluator to make inferences about 
what causes applicants’ to behave in such a manner. DST predicts that 
these inferences will be largely made on the basis of gender rather than, 
for instance, on objective performance. In other words, judges will be 
inclined to interrupt female applicants when they pause because pauses 
will be taken to project insecurity. Conversely, judges will not interrupt 
male applicants when they pause, as they will be seen as a sign of self-
control and poise.  If so: 
 
Hypothesis 5: female applicants will be interrupted more often when they 
pause relative to male applicants. 
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Similarly, utterance duration might be viewed in a positive or 
negative light. Candidates could simply take more time to digress and 
hope that they come up with something relevant to say or, conversely 
more time could be used to provide a more detailed and accurate answer. 
Again, according to DST judges will associate the former with female 
applicants and the latter with male applicants. If so. 
 
Hypothesis 6: female applicants will be interrupted more often when their 
answers last longer relative to the answers of male applicants. 
 
Pauses & Utterance Duration 
Even if hypotheses 4 and 5 are confirmed, it is entirely plausible 
that men and women pause and give lengthy answers for different 
reasons, in which case confirmation of the hypotheses above would not 
automatically imply that women are being treated unfairly.  
As mentioned earlier, experts were hired to evaluate (a) questions’ 
difficulty and (b) answers’ quality. Having objective measures of these 
two will make it possible to ascertain whether exam judges are indeed 
using a double standard to evaluate applicants or, conversely, male and 
female applicants’ similar behaviors have different causes. The following 
two hypotheses will be assessed: 
 
Hypothesis 7: pausing will not hinder the objective quality of applicants’ 
performance (thereby suggesting that pausing results from thoughtfulness 
not incompetence).  
 
Hypothesis 8: answer duration will not hinder the objective quality of 
applicants’ performance (thereby suggesting that speech duration results 
from knowledge not empty discourse).  
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If hypotheses 7 and 8 are confirmed, it will be possible to establish 
that a double standard to judge applicants is being used. In other words, if 
both male and female applicants pause and extend their speech because 
they are thoughtful and wish to showcase their knowledge carefully and at 
length, there is no reason why applicants should be penalized with 
interruptions when they exhibit these behaviors. If women are being 
interrupted more when their behavior could either signal carefulness or 
incompetence but we know for sure it does signal the former, it can be 
determined that it is judges’ biases based on gendered assumptions that 
compelled them to make erroneous inferences leading to differential and 
unfavorable treatment of female applicants.   
 
Number of Questions & Question Difficulty 
DST argues that stricter standards will be used when evaluating 
female applicants or that more evidence of competence will be required 
from women to consider them as capable as men. In this context, this 
could mean that women receive more difficult questions from judges than 
male applicants. Since I gathered unbiased measures of question 
difficulty, it will be possible to evaluate the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 9: female applicants will be asked more difficult questions 
than male applicants.  
 
Hypothesis 10: female applicants will be asked more questions than their 
male counterparts.  
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Is Objective Quality Enough? 
Gender status theories suggest that similar evidence of skill is 
interpreted differently for male and female applicants and that male 
applicants’ performance will be evaluated more positively than that of 
their female competitors. Therefore, 
 
Hypothesis 11: the objective quality of male applicant’s answers will have 
a greater positive impact on the likelihood of passing the exam than that 
of female applicants.  
 
Data & Methods 
Evaluating the hypotheses above required using very different set 
of data that was obtained from covert observation15 of live exam sessions. 
Many feel that covert observation is unethical. In this case, it was judged 
best for the wellbeing of individuals in the setting to proceed in this 
manner. These are public exams; as such, both applicants and judges are 
                                                
15 Summary of IRB Procedures: this research was governed by and passed US 
institutional review board but was not required to go through the Spanish equivalent. I 
obtained permission to conduct interviews and covert observation and taping of exam 
sessions. The justification for proceeding covertly was that not doing so would cause 
suspicion and stress among participants. Recording was necessary because note-taking 
proved insufficient and ineffective. Exam sessions were taped using an MP3 device 
unnoticed by participants. The recordings were daily downloaded and saved under 
password as voice files in my Macbook. Nobody except myself had access to the 
recordings.  Transcriptions do not have attached names or any personal information 
which could give away the identity of the individuals whose voice was recorded. 
Recordings will under no circumstances be played in public or used in 
talks/presentations. All recordings will be destroyed well before the results of the 
study are published. Finally, I reviewed the regulations governing these exams and 
found nothing which indicating recording these public exams is illegal in Spain. 
Furthermore, I consulted these issues with two Spanish lawyers whose expert opinion 
is that the research design is in accordance with Spanish law. In sum, the proposed 
data collection methodology did not pose risks to participants nor is it illegal under 
Spanish law.  
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used to having an audience when exams take place. My presence in the 
setting was perceived as natural and routine. Second, telling participants 
about the purpose of me being there might have affected their actual 
behavior in the classic Hawthorne effect (Landsberger, 1958) thereby 
leading to lower quality data and, most importantly, affecting applicants' 
chances for employment. Similarly, briefing the judges on the research 
may affected their behavior. 
Exam sessions were taped using a concealed MP3 device; 
recordings were then processed and transcribed. In addition, these data 
required extensive coding and cleaning before they could be analyzed. 
About 68% (n=83) of exam sessions were taped. Most were recorded 
between November and December of 2005, covering the full 8 weeks over 
which Exam 3 took place. The remainder exam sessions could not be 
taped due to various reasons. Sometimes the committee assistant would 
forget to invite observers inside the exam premises (n=8). There are no 
reasons to suspect that failures to remember this were intentional. Some 
candidates specifically requested that there would be no observers in the 
exam premises. In order to avoid interacting with future applicants before 
their exams, I stayed away from the exam room as much as possible. As a 
result, I failed to hear the committee’s assistant invite observers. Third, I 
missed 17 exams for personal reasons. The latter two forms of missing 
data are likewise unproblematic, as there is no reason to think that I 
missed a nonrandom selection of exams. A more troubling source of 
missing data is the 11 examinees (8 females, 3 males) who explicitly 
requested that there be no audience in the room, a request that I of course 
honored. Nonetheless I checked that these 11 applicants were not any 
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more likely to fail or pass than the rest, which could have been a source of 
bias in my final dataset.   
Of these 83 recordings, 4 had to be excluded from some parts of the 
analysis due to very poor sound quality – i.e. questions and answers could 
not be transcribed. A total of 33 and 50 recordings of male and female 
applicants respectively were used in this analysis. In the actual population 
of 126 applicants, about 32% were male. To obtain a proportional sample 
about 26 males (i.e. 40%) and 54 women should have been recorded. 
Since the interest of this project is to examine gender differences, male 
applicants were slightly over sampled so that the male group would not be 
too reduced (see Table 13).  
 
 
Table 13 Sampling Details of Total Exam Sessions 
 and Taped Exams Sessions, ACE Competition 2005 
 
  Men Women Total 
40 86 126 Total 
Exams 32% 68% 100% 
33 50 83 Taped 
Exams 40% 60% 100% 
 
Each of the 79 recordings contained (1) the actual one-hour 
rehearsal, and (2) a 15 minute Q&A portion where judges ask applicants 
questions related to part one. A total of 100 hours of exams were taped; of 
those, approximately 17 hours (Mean= 12’, SD=2’9”) of judge-applicant 
conversations were processed and used for this analysis.  
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Transcription & Coding 
The Q&A segments contained (1) judge utterances, typically in the 
form of questions, and (2) applicant speech, usually in the form of 
answers. Other utterances included: clarifications. minimal responses. 
question tags etc. For clarity purposes I henceforth understand as 
questions all judges’ utterances and as answers all applicants’ utterances.  
All audible questions in the 79 Q&A portions were transcribed - a 
total of 883 out of 1281 questions that could be counted, roughly 69%. In 
other words, some utterances could be identified as questions posed by 
judges but coherent transcription was not possible as the audio quality 
was too poor16. Transcription of answers was even more problematic for 
several reasons. First, applicants tend to speak with a lower tone of voice 
relative to judges; while for a given recording transcribing questions was 
feasible, transcription of the answers was not always possible. Second, 
questions tend to be shorter – even if a proportion of the words were 
inaudible, the question could still be inferred. Answers on the other hand 
were longer and a little less focused making it more difficult to make 
sense of them in the presence of inaudible segments.   
A subset of recordings with the greatest sound quality was selected 
for transcription of the answers. Next I will describe and explain the steps 
I took to be sure my selection criteria did not introduce bias. All 
recordings were rated on a sound quality scale of 1 (very poor) to 3 
(excellent). Those rated as 2.5 or above were selected for transcription – 
45% of sample. Table 14 shows that selected recordings of male and 
                                                
16 The exam premises are located in downtown Madrid. Noise pollution is high and 
this and other unpredictable factors affected the quality of some recordings.  
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female applicants result in a reasonably balanced sample. In other words, 
men and women who fail and pass are represented in similar percentages 
in my sample of 35 applicants. These 35 applicants answered a total of 
591 questions. Of these, 513 could be transcribed (about 85%).   
 
Table 14 Sampling Details of Recordings  
Selected for Answer Transcription 
 
   Males Females 
High 
Quality 11 13 
Total  24 28 Pass 
 % 0.46 0.46 
High 
Quality 4 8 
Total 9 19 Fail 
% 0.44 0.42 
 
 The coding process was three-fold with each phase requiring a 
tailored approach. A first category of items could be quantified in a 
straightforward manner (i.e. number of questions, speech time measured 
in seconds). The second group of items (i.e. quality and difficulty of 
answers and questions) required hiring qualified coders unaware of the 
study’s hypotheses. These coders evaluated questions’ difficulty and 
answers’ quality on seven-point scales. Finally, a third type of event (i.e. 
interruptions, pauses) were coded following prescriptions drawn from a 
review of the existing literature and by establishing inter-rater reliability17.  
                                                
17 Inter-rater reliability was established using 5 recordings chosen at random and 
comparing my results with those of my assistant. Each comparison was analyzed so as 
to arrive at very specific definitions and criteria for coding the event of interest. When 
90% consensus was reached, I started coding all recordings from scratch.  
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Two experts (a female and male) were hired to evaluate questions 
on a seven-point difficulty scale (1 = “very difficult” and 7 = “not difficult 
at all”). Evaluators where selected based on their expertise in the subject 
matter of the exams – i.e. they are or exam trainers of prospective ACE 
applicants. I selected two people who had recently passed the selection 
process themselves (i.e. 2-3 years as ACE officials) because they would 
be more likely to be well acquainted with the study guide than judges who 
entered the ACE corps 15 or 20 years ago.  
Coders were first given transcriptions of the questions. Answers 
were removed so that they would not impact the perception of the 
question (i.e. a hard question may appear easier if the applicant provided a 
brilliant answer). The gender of applicants and judges was unknown to 
expert evaluators who were also unaware of the study’s hypotheses. Each 
of the two raters evaluated a total of 881 questions.  
 The two expert coders had different rating behaviors. While the male 
rater avoided extreme values of the seven-point scale; the female rater 
preferred these instead of values in between. However, the ratings of both 
male and female experts point to a similar pattern, namely the absence of 
differences in the average difficulty level of questions asked to male and 
female applicants.  
 According to the male rater, the average question difficulty for 
female applicants was 4.45 (SD = 0.98) and for male applicants 4.40 (SD 
= 0.97). As for the female rater, the average difficulty for female 
applicants was 5.02 (SD = 2.39) and for male applicants 4.82 (SD = 2.56). 
The direction of the ratings is similar; according to both, female 
applicants are asked slightly easier questions (1=very difficult, 7=not 
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difficult at all). Differences between male and female applicants are 
greater according to the female coder (i.e. 0.2 versus 0.06 for the male 
coder). But for neither coder were these small gender differences 
statistically significant.  
 After coding the questions for difficulty, hired coders were given a 
list of the questions and answers and were asked to evaluate the quality of 
answers on a seven-point scale (1=very poor quality and 7=very high 
quality). I arranged several meetings with both coders separately and 
made sure they understood the purpose of the job.  
 Quality refers to how well or how accurately does the answer address 
the question being asked. The male coder’s average rating for female 
applicant quality was 4.66 (SD = 1.69) and for male applicants, 4.95 
(SD=2.04). According to the female coder, the average answer quality for 
female applicants is 4.95 (SD=2.42) and for male applicants 5.52 
(SD=1.98). Again, answer quality differences between male and female 
applicants are larger according to the female coder’s ratings (i.e. 0.57 
versus 0.29 according to the male coder).  
 However different, the ratings of both coders lean toward the same 
direction, namely male applicants provide, on average, somewhat better 
answers than female applicants. If the coders ratings had pointed to 
different directions it could have been problematic because averaging 
over the two would have cancelled out the effect. This was not the case in 
the study; thus, differences between the coders are not too problematic. 
 In the next paragraphs I will describe the dependent and independent 
measures obtained from the three-fold coding process outlined above.  
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Dependent & Independent Measures 
Pauses & Speech Duration: Pauses are understood as brief 
interruptions of speech (2 or more seconds) at the beginning of the 
speaker’s turn. Speech duration was measured in seconds and refers to the 
time an applicant takes answering a question.    
Interruptions & Quasi-Interruptions: An interruption occurs when 
the talk of one person is intruded upon by the talk of another person. The 
mere presence of speech overlap does not itself constitute sufficient 
grounds for calling something an interruption. Interruptions may be 
regarded as such if the first speaker is unable to finish making a point or 
the topic is cut out short by the intrusion (LaFrance 1992).  
A limit of some past research has been to ignore distinction among 
different types of interruptions. Most prior works have treated interruption 
as a unitary event. Nonetheless, researchers have suggested caution in 
assuming that the term interruption is well defined and non-problematic. 
Prior research has operationalized interruptions very differently: (1) 
undefined or broadly defined, (2) excluding back channels and minimal 
responses, (3) successful interruption (e.g. Kollock, Blumstein, & 
Schwartz 1985; Smith-Lovin & Brody 1989). In this work I tried to go 
beyond these and differentiated four types of speech overlap that can be 
confused with successful interruption. Table 15 below summarizes four 
types of situations that were often observed in my Q&A recordings. Only 
situation 1 constitutes an interruption as I have defined it in this work.  
In situation 2, although the hypothetical applicant has not finished 
the judge intervention is presumably made with the intent to clarify the 
original question. Clarifications of the sort may sometimes be disrupting 
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for applicants; nonetheless, it seems plausible that judges interrupt to 
clarify in order to help applicants. Sometimes applicants request that 
something be clarified to them. Both volunteered and requested 
clarifications were coded separately as their meaning could be open to 
interpretation.  
 
Table 15 Examples of Interruptions and Quasi-Interruptions  
 
Situation 1: Interruption Situation 2: Clarification 
J: when was the communist party 
made legal?  
A: in 1977 when… (unfinished 
speech)   
J: but what specific day and 
month? 
A: April 9th 
J: when was the communist party 
made legal?  
A: In… (<1/2” pause. unfinished 
speech) 
J: I mean the Spanish Communist 
Party.  
A: April 9th 1977 
Situation 3: Cooperative Overlap Situation 4: Follow Up Question 
J: when was the communist party 
made legal?  
A: In 1977  
J: Uh. uh (cooperative overlap)  
A: April 9th to be specific.  
J: when was the communist party 
made legal?  
A: in 1978 (< 1” gap)  
J: what specific day and month?  
A: April 9th 
Note: “J” stands for judge and “A” stands for applicant. 
 
Active listening can lead to simultaneous talk without being 
interruptive (West & Zimmerman 1983). Situation 3 exemplifies this case. 
Minimal responses such as “uh, uh” “yes” “aha” were not considered 
interruptions.  
Sometimes judges asked a question right after an applicant finished 
answering. How these affect candidates is hard to determine. On the one 
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hand, it may convey a bit of impatience from the judge. But also, a fast-
paced Q&A could suggest that the evaluator is satisfied with the answers 
given and wants to move on to the next swiftly. These events I have called 
quasi-interruptions were coded separately.   
Answers’ Quality & Questions’ Difficulty: finally, the two expert 
raters evaluated a total of 881 questions (1=very difficult, 7= not difficult 
at all) and 453 answers (1=very poor quality, 7=very good quality). I 
averaged over the two coders and used the resulting difficulty and quality 
measures for analysis.  
 
Method & Descriptive Statistics 
Regression models were used to assess the impact of applicants’ 
gender, pauses, and speech durations on judges’ interruptions. A second 
set of models evaluate the impact of applicants’ pauses and speech 
utterances on unbiased measures of answer quality. Third, I examined 
whether gender affected the quantity and objective difficulty of judges’ 
questions. Finally, a regression model was used to determine the effect of 
gender, and objective answer quality on the likelihood of passing the 
exam. In these models, standard errors were clustered by applicant ID to 
correct for non-independence.  
Tables 16 through 19 provide some descriptive statistics for the 
variables used. The level of analysis is question-answer (except in the 
cases specified above). Judges made a total of 1282 questions (462 to 
male applicants and 819 to female applicants). Male judges asked the 
majority of the questions (about 78%). The rest, 284 (22%) were asked by 
female evaluators.  
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Male judges clearly dominate the Q&A; meaning, it is not always 
the case that there are a disproportionate number of male judges. In fact, 
evaluating committees tend to be balanced in terms of gender (i.e. about 
63% of applicants had a gender balanced committee; 7% had a female-
dominated committee; 30% had a male-dominated committee).  
 
Table 16 Descriptive Statistics of Main Variables 
            N Mean S.D. 
     
Women 50 60%   Gender 
 Men 33 40%  
Women 819 64%  Questions 
  Men 462 36%  
Women 819 2.44 2.15 Answer Time Men 462 3.35 3.55 
Women 535 4.73 1.47 Difficulty Men 346 4.61 1.55 
Women 275 4.81 1.69 Quality Men 178 5.21 1.39 
          
 
Male applicants were interrupted in about 20% of the questions 
(N=91) while women were interrupted in about 30% (N=252). About 88% 
(n=71) of interruptions directed at male applicants were single 
interruptions while 12% (n=20) were multiple – applicants are interrupted 
more than once while attempting to answer the same question. As for 
female applicants. 66% (n=165) were single interruptions while 34% 
(n=87) of them were multiple.  
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Table 17 Summary of Judge Interruptions  
by Applicants’ Gender  
 
  Interruptions Total 
Women 31% 100% 
  252 819 
Men 20% 100% 
  91 462 
 
Table 18 Summary of Applicants’ Pauses  
by Applicant’s Gender 
 
  Pause Total 
Women 15% 100% 
  126 819 
Men 17% 100% 
  78 462 
 
 
Table 19 Summary of Applicants’ Pass/Fail  
In Exam 3 by Applicant’s Gender  
 
Exam 3 Outcome 
        
  Fail Pass Total 
Female 40% 60% 100% 
  20 30 50 
Male 27% 73% 100% 
  9 24 33 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
PART II: RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
 
 In the first part of this project (i.e. Chapters 5 & 6) I proposed that 
women suffer greater discrimination in exam 3 than in others because this 
round of testing allows a less constrained interaction between evaluators 
and applicants. In Chapter 7, I offered a set of empirical predictions to 
determine whether this general claim has empirical support. Simply put, I 
asked: if the features of exam 3 Q&A are pushing judges to act more on 
their gendered expectations, what behaviors would reveal it?  
 Next I asked various specific questions (hypotheses 3 to 11); the 
answers to these predictions should help us understand the specific 
mechanisms that are putting female applicants at a disadvantage relative 
to male applicants only in exam 3. Recall from the theory chapter that 
double standards theory argues that a different and more strict criteria will 
be used to evaluate women in mixed-sex settings. My results suggest that 
faced with similar information, evaluators will be less forgiving with 
female applicants than with male applicants. Furthermore, I will 
demonstrate that behaviors that are interpreted as indicative of lack of 
ability in female applicants are in fact uncorrelated with objective skill.  
 
Hypotheses 3 & 4: Who Interrupts Whom?  
I argued that male judges would interrupt female applicants more than 
male applicants. As explained in previous chapters, the literature on 
gender, status, and interruptions says that high status actors will be 
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entitled to and exhibit more dominant behaviors. Interruptions are seen as 
displays of status. Thus, judges, particularly male judges, will be more 
likely to interrupt female applicants than male applicants.  If so, 
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where y is the independent variable judge interruption. x1 is a dummy 
variable for applicant’s gender (1= female applicant); x2 is a dummy for 
judge’s gender (1= female judge), and their interaction term.  
The results of Model 4 are summarized in Table 20 and show that 
female applicants are more likely to be interrupted than male applicants 
except when a female judge is interviewing them. The magnitude and sign 
of coefficient λ indicates that female applicants interviewed by male 
judges will be interrupted roughly once every two questions (α +λ = 0.56 
per question) while male applicants interviewed by male judges will be 
interrupted once every four questions (α = 0.26 per question). Female 
applicants appear to enjoy a greater advantage than their male 
counterparts when female judges are the ones interviewing them (α +λ 
+ϕ + ϖ = 0.16 versus α +ϕ  = 0.11 for males interviewed by females). 
These results confirm what other authors have previously found – i.e. men 
interrupt women most of the time. 
 
Hypothesis 5: When Do Interruptions Occur? Pauses 
My focus on interruptions is theory-driven, meaning, the purpose of 
this research is not to settle academic debates on the topic. Interruptions 
are penalties that judges administer to applicants presumably when 
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applicants are not performing as expected. Judges interrupt if applicants 
make mistakes, beat around the bush, do not sound convincing, take too 
long to answer etc. So interruptions provide valuable information about 
judges’ unobservable performance expectations for applicants.  
A question of interest is then: when do judges interrupt? when do 
judges react negatively to what applicants say? Hypotheses 4 and 5 will 
help establish when interruptions occur and why. Recall from chapter 4 
that I measured several applicants’ behaviors, particularly pauses and 
speech duration. The literature on nonverbal cues tells us that these 
behaviors are important but that their actual meaning is not univocal. 
Pauses may reveal poise or insecurity; speech duration could originate in 
knowledge or lack of fluency. If judges interrupt when confronted with 
such behaviors, it can be inferred that they thought applicants were 
insecure and under prepared.  
I built two regression models (Models 5 and 6) which will permit 
assessing when male and female applicants are interrupted. Knowing this 
will help infer why judges interrupted (i.e. they thought the applicant was 
unskilled) or did not (i.e. they thought the applicant was calm).  Model 5 
examines the effect of applicants’ gender and pausing behavior on the 
likelihood of being interrupted: 
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where y is the independent variable judges’ interruptions. x1 is a dummy 
variable for applicant’s gender (1=female applicant); x2 is a dummy for 
judge’s gender (1= female judge), and their interaction term. The model 
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includes applicant pauses x3, and a second interaction term of pause and 
female.  
As Table 20 shows, the patterns found in Model 4 still hold – i.e. 
female applicants are interrupted twice as much as male applicants when 
interviewed by male judges (females, α +λ =0.52 versus males, α = 0.26). 
The coefficient for the main effect of pause σ is not significant and has a 
positive sign thereby suggesting that male applicants are not penalized 
with interruptions when they pause. In contrast, female applicants are 
interrupted (ε = 0.18 more for every pause made) when exhibiting the 
same behavior.  
These results indicate that judges probably believe that women 
pause because they are unsure while men pause because they are cautious 
or thoughtful. The real question then becomes if judges’ inferences are 
based on the objective performance of an applicant or on the applicant’s 
status attributes. In other words, do male and female applicants pause for 
different reasons as the interrupting behavior of judges suggest? Or 
conversely, do judges interpret similar behavior differently as a function 
of the applicant’s gender? I will return to this question when discussing 
hypothesis 7.   
 
Hypothesis 6: When Do Interruptions Occur? Speech Duration 
 Like pauses, applicants’ answer length reveals something about 
applicants’ performances. Interpreting pauses is not precise because they 
can either signal confidence or insecurity. Similarly, speech duration can 
be perceived in different ways. Applicants may keep the floor because 
they are knowledgeable or because they are unsure and simply wander 
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hoping to say something relevant. If judges believe applicants give a 
lengthy answer because they are learned, it is safe to assume that judges 
will refrain from interrupting the applicant. On the other hand, if judges 
think applicants are giving unnecessarily long answers and going off on a 
tangent, judges will interrupt them so as to not waste limited Q&A time. 
To evaluate how judges respond to the length of applicants’ utterances, 
Model 6 incorporates two more terms relative to Model 5, namely 
applicants’ speech duration and the interaction of gender and speech 
duration:  
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where y is the independent variable judges’ interruptions, x1 is a dummy 
variable for applicant’s gender (1= female applicant); x2 is a dummy for 
judge’s gender (1= female judge), and their interaction term. The model 
includes applicant pauses x3, and a second interaction term of pause and 
female, as well as x4 which refers to answer duration, and a third 
interaction term of answer duration and gender.   
The coefficients in Table 20 (Model 6) suggest a similar pattern 
than that observed in Model 5. While male applicants do not get penalized 
for keeping the floor, female applicants are more likely to be interrupted 
the longer they keep on talking (ψ = .005 per second). Female applicants 
(not male) are still penalized for pausing (ε =.17). The main effect of 
gender is still positive and large although the term is not significant at 
conventional statistical levels. This suggests that although female 
applicants may be disadvantaged in general relative to males, women are 
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punished when they exhibit particular behaviors such as pausing or giving 
lengthy answers.  
 
Table 20 Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors 
for a Model of  Interruptions (clustered by applicant ID) 
 
  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
        
Female Applicant 0.294 0.258 0.129 
  (4.44)* (3.74)* -1.56 
Female Judge -0.146 -0.146 -0.134 
  -1.47 -1.47 -1.34 
Female_A*Female_J -0.242 -0.232 -0.259 
  (2.05)** (1.97)** (2.19)** 
Pause   0.004 0.01 
    -0.05 -0.14 
Pause*Female   0.182 0.17 
    (1.99)** (1.86)+ 
Answer_Time     -0.001 
      -1.04 
Answer_Time*Female     0.005 
      (3.06)* 
        
Constant 0.259 0.258 0.293 
  (5.04)* (4.79)* (4.59)* 
Observations 1281 1281 1281 
Applicant ID 83 83 83 
    
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
 
These results are interesting because scholars have tried determine 
whether status hierarchies in task groups are based on factors related to 
performance or on behavioral dominance.  These results align well with 
Ridgeway’s findings about the relationship between nonverbal behavior 
and status (see Ridgeway 1987). Ridgeway provided empirical evidence 
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that status is based primarily on expectations about task performance 
rather than on behavioral dominance. In my context, this means women 
are not being interrupted just because they are women and thus 
susceptible to be controlled or influenced. Rather, judges interrupt women 
when women’s behavior can be interpreted to confirm judges’ 
preconceived gendered schemas.  Simply put, if judges believe women, 
on average, are less competent than men, ambiguous evidence such as 
pausing is more readily seen as confirmatory of their preconceived ideas 
about women’s competence. As a result, judges interrupt women when 
they exhibit certain behaviors rather than in a random manner just to show 
dominance or control over them.  
 
Hypotheses 7 & 8: Gender Differences or Gendered Interpretations? 
The key question is whether judges’ decisions to interrupt are 
justified or not. In my discussion above I assumed judges’ decisions are 
biased based on the extensive literature on biases and evaluations. But 
technically I have not ruled out the possibility that similar behavior of 
women and men (i.e. pausing, lengthy answers) has a different origin. In 
other words, it is plausible that male applicants pause because they are 
calm and women pause because they are unskilled. Although the 
assumption of unbiased evaluations is inconsistent with the literature, the 
data collected for this project can offer empirical evidence to clarify this 
question. This is the task to which I next turn. 
Recall that expert coders were hired to rate the quality of 
applicants’ answers. Since I have objective measures of skill, it will be 
possible to disentangle the above questions empirically. Model 7 will help 
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establish whether applicant’s gender, pauses, and answer duration have 
any effect on objective answer quality (controlling for question difficulty).  
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where y is the independent measure answer quality, x1 is a dummy 
variable for applicant’s gender (1=female applicant); x2 refers to applicant 
number of pauses; third, the model includes an interaction term female 
and pause,  x3 is speech duration, and x4 is question difficulty.  
 
Table 21 Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors  for a Model of 
Answer Quality (clustered by applicant ID) 
 
   Model 7 
Female Applicant -0.334 
  -1.34 
Pause -0.476 
  (1.85)+ 
Pause*Female 0.282 
  -0.88 
Answer_Time 0.006 
  (1.98)** 
Question Difficulty 0.085 
  -1.55 
    
Constant 4.631 
  (13.25)* 
Observations 378 
Applicant ID 35 
  
 
Table 21 summarizes the results for this model of answer quality. 
Although female has a negative effect on quality, the coefficient is not 
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statistically significant. Pausing behavior affects the quality of male 
answers not that of female applicants’ answers – the main effect is 
significant and has a negative sign (ϕ = - 0.48). Interestingly, this suggests 
that when men pause it is probably due to lack of skill or nervousness. 
Thus, pauses in male applicants are negatively correlated with objective 
answer quality. Using more time to reply to a question positively impacts 
the objective quality of both male and female answers (σ = .006). This 
suggests that when applicants provide lengthier answers they do so 
because they have relevant things to discuss thereby producing a higher 
quality response. Taken together these results show that pausing should 
not be viewed as a sign of weakness in female applicants. Furthermore, it 
is for male applicants that pauses are negatively correlated with the 
objective quality of their responses. If anyone, it is male applicants that 
should receive penalties (i.e. interruptions) for pausing. These findings 
illustrate how a double standard can operate in a natural setting. Behavior 
such as pausing or speech duration can easily be interpreted in a positive 
or negative light. As these findings suggest, exam judges prefer to give 
male applicants the benefit of the doubt (and not interrupt them); while 
denying the same treatment to women even when, objectively, it should 
be the other way around. 
 Having objective measures of answer quality was essential to 
clarify whether real gender differences among applicants or judges’ 
gender biased assumptions are responsible for judges’ differential 
treatment of male and female applicants. Previous research has rarely 
offered this kind of detailed information. Thus, demand and supply side 
mechanisms could hardly be adjudicated. At the same time, experiments 
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have demonstrated that evaluations are biased but laboratory settings are 
artificial. This means that the mechanisms found may unfold very 
differently in complex settings. This analysis convincingly proves that 
men and women are being treated differently when they behave similarly 
and for similar reasons. I focused on judges’ interruptions because it is a 
behavior that could be observed and operationalized, and because as I 
have argued throughout this discussion interruptions can be interpreted as 
nothing other than negative sanctions in this setting. This doesn’t mean 
that differential treatment is limited to this specific behavior nor that 
interruptions are the most important type of penalty.  
Interruptions are consequential in substantive ways (i.e. they stress 
applicants, they make them tired and so forth) but, in the larger picture, 
interruptions are merely an example of how evaluators react differently to 
identical behaviors exhibited by applicants who differ in their status 
characteristics. With this I would like to stress that is probably an array of  
judges’ behaviors that were not (or could not be) measured that would 
indicate a similar pattern.  
 
Hypotheses 9 & 10: Do Questions Differ for Men and Women? 
In the paragraphs above I showed that judges penalize female 
applicants by interrupting them when they are trying to answer a question 
and that there is no apparent justification for these interruptions vis a vis 
answer quality. In this section I will evaluate other behaviors that lead to 
support for differential treatment of men and women by judges. I argued 
that because judges will use harsher standards to evaluate women, they 
will ask them more (hypothesis 10) and more difficult questions 
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(hypothesis 9) . Double standards theory posits that when women provide 
evidence of skill, evaluators tend to scrutinize that evidence because it is 
inconsistent with their prior expectations. In this context, this might mean 
that women receive a greater number of questions than male applicants in 
the Q&A portion. I assess this with a simple regression model of the 
following form:  
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where y is the independent measure total number of questions and x1 is a 
dummy variable for applicant’s gender (1= female applicant).  
Table 22 shows that statistically significant gender differences were 
found in the number of questions male and female applicants were asked - 
women receive about 2.5 more questions than do males (baseline=14). 
This suggests that judges are more demanding when interviewing female 
applicants. This relationship stays even when a measure of answer quality 
is fit in the model (Table 22, Model 9). In other words, if better answers 
would lead to fewer questions, it could be argued that more questions are 
asked when judges believe answers are not satisfactory and thus further 
proof of ability might be required. These data show that this is not the 
case. Quality does not have any effect on the fact that female applicants 
receive a greater number of questions. Women who perform as well as 
men receive on average 4 more questions from judges than their male 
counterparts. 
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Table 22 Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors 
for a Model of Total Number of Questions 
 
  Model 8 Model 9 
     
Female Applicant 2.50 4.36 
  (1.42)+ (1.87)* 
Answer Quality  1.10 
  1.34 
Constant 14.12 8.99 
  (1.11)** (7.04)** 
Observations 83 83 
 
 
 
Double standards theory would suggest that, since stricter standards 
will be used to judge women’s competence, exam judges will ask female 
applicants harder questions thereby raising the standard relative to men. 
Model 10 evaluates the effect of applicant’s and judge’s genders on my 
objective measure of question difficulty.  
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where y is the independent measure question difficulty (1=more difficult; 
7=less difficult), x1 is a dummy variable for applicant’s gender (1= female 
applicant); x2 is  judge’s gender (1=female judge).  
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Table 23 Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors 
for a Model of Question Difficulty 
 
 Model 10 
Female Applicant 0.117 
 -1.00 
Female Judge 0.309 
 (1.93)+ 
  
Constant 4.586 
 (50.22)* 
  
Observations 881 
Applicant ID 79 
 
 
As can be seen in Table 23 this hypothesis was not supported by the 
data. Although the coefficient for female goes is in the predicted direction 
(i.e. positive sign indicates that women receive harder questions), its 
standard error is quite large, and consequently not significant according to 
conventional standards. Since applicant’s gender is not significant it 
cannot be argued that female applicants receive more difficult questions 
than their male competitors. Female judges ask both male and female 
applicants harder questions.  
A model was estimated that included an interaction term female 
applicant and female judge but it was not statistically significant. This 
evidence suggests that both male and female applicants receive similarly 
difficult questions from male judges and harder questions from female 
evaluators.  
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These results suggest that judges’ double standards are reactive 
rather than proactive. In other words, judges may not actively raise the 
standard by adjusting the difficulty level of questions depending on the 
applicant’s gender. Rather, judges react differently when confronted with 
very similar information provided by male and female applicants (i.e. 
pauses and speech duration). Understandably it requires more cognitive 
resources to adjust the difficulty of a question based the status attributes 
of those being evaluated.  
SCT and DST argue that these are processes that occur out of 
awareness, thus it is reasonable to assume that behavioral responses are 
also spontaneous rather than calculated. Weighting and adjusting the 
difficulty level of questions requires effort, it is possible that while double 
standards apply to other more involuntary behaviors such as interrupting, 
it does not impact conscious behaviors such as tuning the difficulty level 
of questions as a function of applicant’s gender. 
 
Hypothesis 11: Is Male and Female Competence Perceived Similarly? 
DST argues that the same evidence of competence and ability is 
perceived differently depending on whether such evidence comes from 
men or women. In this context this theory would lead us to anticipate that 
that even when female applicants provide answers as good as their male 
counterparts, their chances of passing the exam would be lower. The 
logistic regression model specified below evaluates the hypothesis that 
objective performance quality is weighted differently by evaluators based 
on applicant’s gender: 
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where y is the independent variable pass (1=pass; 0=fail). x1 is a dummy 
variable for applicant’s gender (1= female applicant); x2 is answer quality 
(1= female judge), the interaction term of female and answer quality; and  
x3 question difficulty.  
 
Table 24 Coefficients from a Logistic Regression of the (Log odds) of 
Passing Exam 3 on Gender, Answer Quality, & Gender*Quality 
 
  Model 11 Model 12  
      
Female Applicant -.23 1.04  
  .26 .79  
Answer Quality  .27  
   (.13)*  
Female_A*A_Quality  -.25  
   (.15)+  
Question Difficulty  -.18  
   (.08)*  
Constant 1.06 .43  
 (.17)** .76  
    
Observations 453 378  
 
 
 Table 24 below summarizes two models, first a simple model to 
evaluate the impact of gender on the log odds of passing exam 3, and 
second, a the more complex model specified above (Model 12). The 
results of Model 11 indicate that women are disadvantaged in exam 3 
although the coefficient is not significant. Model 12 shows that objective 
quality increases the odds of passing the exam for male applicants only. 
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The coefficient for women is preceded by a negative sign and it is 
significant at 10%. It is intuitive to think that the greater the quality of an 
applicant’s responses the greater his/her chances of passing the exam. If 
this were the case for both male and female applicants, answer quality 
would have a positive effect on the chances of passing for both men and 
women examinees. This results provide evidence that this is not the case.  
It is true that the Q&A does not represent the entirety of the exam, 
only a part of it. Nonetheless it is safe to assume that performances in the 
two portions (one hour rehearsal and Q&A) are correlated. In other words, 
applicants who do well in the Q&A have probably done well in the first 
part of the exam. Thus, quality in the Q&A should be a good proxy for 
candidate’s performance. These results suggest that evaluators use answer 
quality as a reliable indicator of competence for male not female 
applicants.  
The results discussed above suggest clear evidence of a double 
standard when evaluating male and female applicants. Hypothesis 7 was 
disconfirmed, which indicates that judges do not consciously make it 
more difficult for female applicants. Judges interrupt women more and 
ask them more questions but these are spontaneous behaviors. 
Formulating questions of varying degrees of difficulty demands a more 
conscious effort. Judges’ double standards revealed by interruptions occur 
in reaction to available evidence for applicants (pausing, speech length). 
This is consistent with the gender and status literature which points out 
that status characteristics shape performance expectations subconsciously.   
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CHAPTER NINE 
SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS 
 
 Empirical evidence demonstrates that sex segregation in employment 
is still high and several explanations have been proposed to explain it. 
However, almost all empirical research on sex segregation is based on 
data of people who already have jobs. Thus, it has been difficult to 
identify mechanisms operating at the point of hiring. Laboratory 
experiments have made important contributions about what these 
mechanisms are but still we need to know what they look like outside 
artificial settings. 
This project represents one of the first efforts to combine the best of 
both worlds: real data on employer practices that are sufficient to identify 
micro level mechanisms. The results of this research indicate that the 
causal mechanisms discovered in controlled environments can also be 
found in more complex contexts. Furthermore, this work illustrates the 
usefulness of using theories developed in laboratory settings to guide 
research in real-world situations.  
Gender status theories have argued that since men are perceived as 
diffusely more competent and skilled than women, concrete men will also 
appear to do things better than equally qualified women when gender is 
salient. In this project I have described and examined a setting that 
permits evaluating these claims in a natural environment. The hiring 
process I analyzed involves exams where both neutral and feminine skills 
are assessed. I found that female applicants do better at exams involving 
verbal skills, which are stereotypically viewed as female, while men do 
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better all other exams, which involve the assessment of more neutral 
abilities.  
The results presented here also suggest that the degree of structure 
in interaction moderates the effects of salient status characteristics. 
Researchers have argued that the sex-categorization that takes place in 
interaction prompts the use of gender stereotypes to guide attitudes and 
behavior. I have shown that the degree of structure in applicant-judge 
interactions will impact the extent to which actors in the setting will be 
allowed to act on their gendered assumptions. Specifically, I have 
proposed that settings where interaction is minimal or less structured will 
leave it to the individual’s choice to exercise behaviors attuned to his/her 
gender beliefs. Contexts where interaction more structured will have the 
opposite effect; namely, individuals in the setting will have more limited 
opportunities to behave according to their gendered expectations. In this 
work I  demonstrated that women score significantly lower than men only 
in exam 3, the only round where applicants and judges interact in a less 
structured manner. In sum, the degree of structure condition has helped 
make more accurate predictions about the magnitude of the advantage or 
disadvantage that men and women face in this setting.  
The second part of this research relies on more detailed data on the 
interactions of applicants and judges in the Q&A part of exam 3. I have 
examined judges and applicants behavior that reveal aspects of their 
evaluations and performances respectively. Judges performance 
expectations are not directly observable. However, I explained that 
measuring interruptions should reveal the judges’ cognitive processes  as 
they assess job applicants. For example. if judges believe the responses of 
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applicants are more relevant and interesting, judges will refrain from 
interrupting them. Similarly, if the contributions of applicants are 
perceived as less valuable, judges will have less tolerance for long 
speeches and will interrupt more often. Thus, an analysis of judges 
interruptions should provide a good read of judges’ reactions as they 
evaluate applicants. Interruptions are a highly useful measure because, as 
argued throughout the project, they cannot be interpreted positively in this 
context.  
I found that women are interrupted more relative to male applicants 
and that these interruptions seem unjustified. Even though interruptions 
may not impact women’s performance directly, it is likely that other 
judges believe interruptions are deserved. Recall from chapter 3 that 
reward distribution affects performance expectations. What this means in 
my setting is that other judges will see these interruptions as legitimate 
and will infer that female applicants are under qualified.  
In this project I have demonstrated that female applicants are 
treated worse even when there is no basis for linking their behavior to 
objective lack of ability. Also, this research demonstrates that male 
applicants do not receive these negative sanctions and that a much more 
lenient standard is used with them – even though behaviors such as 
pausing are negatively correlated with objective quality answers in male 
applicants. 
Having behavioral measures from both evaluators and applicants, 
as well as objective measures (i.e. answer quality and question difficulty) 
made it possible to identify the use of double standards in the treatment 
and evaluation of real job applicants and effectively rule out the 
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possibility that female applicants are indeed performing at a lower level 
than male candidates.   
Interrupting, pausing, and speech duration are some but not all of 
the behaviors that matter in this setting. I selected this set of items because 
they were theory-relevant and it was relatively easy to measure them 
reliably and systematically. The behaviors I focused on, measured, and 
analyzed represent a small part of what presumably happens in interaction 
and impacts evaluation. For example, it would be interesting to measure 
judges’ tone of voice. A qualitative observation is that male judges used a 
louder tone of voice when interviewing female applicants. In this setting a 
raised tone of voice directed at applicants would constitute another type of 
sanction similar to interruptions. It would have been interesting to see if 
judges’ raised tone of voice correlated to applicants’ pausing and other 
behaviors. This analysis was not done because noise conditions varied 
considerably across recordings.   
The most important lesson to be gathered from this work is that 
existing inequalities are extremely hard to detect. The differential 
treatment of male and female applicants discussed here may be but a 
small portion of what really happens. With this I want to emphasize that, 
individually these differences in the treatment of men and women may not 
seem serious but, in the aggregate they have a very important cumulative 
effects. Receiving an underserved interruption may not change the course 
of the exam or the applicant’s mindset. But if women feel that judges keep 
interrupting them, fidget, raise their tone of voice and so forth, this host of 
behaviors will definitely impact the female applicant’s performance and 
reveals the judge’s interpretation and evaluation of such performance. 
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Finally, the single most disturbing finding is that the objective 
quality of female applicants’ performances does not impact their chances 
of passing the exam. One would think that the high quality answers would 
lead to higher scores. This is true for male applicants but not females. As 
DST argues, judges see quality as indicative of ability in male not female 
applicants. These findings align well with a recent study by Thomas-Hunt 
and Phillips (2004) where the authors found that women are often 
penalized when they possess the same expertise that men have (Thomas-
Hunt & Phillips 2004).  
This research is unique in that it uses very detailed data to 
document and examine an actual hiring process. This context is 
exceptional in that: (1) is accessible for direct observation and data 
collection. (2) the event of interest (i.e. exam) repeats sufficiently so as to 
evaluate theory-driven claims statistically, and (3) exams are fairly 
structured. which deems the lack of strict controls less problematic.  
My findings suggest subtle but important evidence of judges’ 
partiality in favor of male applicants. The subtlety of such corroborations 
indicates that a major effort needs to be made to identify sources of bias in 
real-world environments. Inequalities that surface in the course of live 
interactions are difficult to pin down. Whatever behavior one identifies 
may be attributed to employers or employees. In order adjudicate between 
supply and demand-type of explanations, unbiased indicators such as 
question difficulty and answer quality need to be gathered and analyzed 
jointly. As I argued in this project, the evidence of bias found illustrate the 
hardly detectable nature of these mechanisms. My findings align well 
with what Ridgeway identifies as the cause of the glass ceiling: “the 
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performance expectations and legitimacy reactions created by gender 
status beliefs create multiple, nearly invisible nets of comparative 
devaluation that catch women as they push forward to achieve positions 
of leadership and authority and slow them down compared to similar 
men” (Ridgeway 1994). 
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